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Casenote
Georgia v. McCollum: Protecting Jurors
From Race-Based Peremptory
Challenges But Forcing Criminal
Defendants to Risk Biased Juries
The peremptory challenge is a jury selection procedure which
gives a litigant the right to exclude particular persons from the jury
without stating a reason.' During jury selection the litigant, usually
through their attorney, uses either a challenge for cause2 or a per-
emptory challenge to exclude prospective jurors.3 The critical dis-
tinction between the two challenges is that while the peremptory
challenge allows the attorney to remove a potential juror without
stating a reason,4 the challenge for cause must be accompanied by
a specific reason.5 Another difference between the two challenges
is that while the trial judge decides whether to grant or deny a
1. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986) (stating that the peremptory challenge
entitles a litigant to remove a juror for any reason at all). Vhile the right to use a peremptory
challenge belongs to the litigant, unless the litigant is representing him or herself, peremptory
challenges are usually exercised by the litigant's attorney. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (granting
peremptory challenges to litigants in criminal trials); see also JAmS J. GOBERT, JURY SECON 276
(2d ed. 1990) (outlining the procedure by which the trial attorney exercises peremptory challenges),
see also infra 57-74 and accompanying text (discussing peremptory challenges).
2. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (stating that the challenge for cause
permits rejection of jurors on a narrowly specified and legally cognizable basis of partiality); infra
notes 36-56 and accompanying text (discussing the challenge for cause).
3. See generally LISA BLYE & JANE N. SAGINAW, JURY SELECTION: STRATEGY AND SCIENCE
§ 2:01-2:03 (1986) (discussing the differences between the challenge for cause and the peremptory
challenge).
4. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (defining the peremptory challenge).
5. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (stating that the challenge for cause permits the exclusion of
potential jurors who, based on specific, provable and legally accepted grounds, are unable to be
impartial); supra note 2 and accompanying text (defining the challenge for cause).
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challenge for cause,6 the trial attorney retains complete control
over the exercise of peremptory challenges.7 The trial attorney can
exercise peremptory challenges for any reason, including sudden
impressions or intuition about a juror's partiality that did not
qualify the juror to be challenged for cause.8 This discretion
enables the trial attorney to remove a juror suspected of bias even
if that juror does not fall within one of the narrow categories
accepted for a causal challenge.9 Furthermore, by excusing jurors
suspected of partiality, the peremptory challenge can neutralize the
adverse effect of a judge's erroneous denial of a challenge for
cause on the outcome of the trial." However, the trial attorney's
complete control over peremptory challenges may also allow the
peremptory challenge to be abused."
Beginning in 1965, the United States Supreme Court attempted
to eliminate the abuse of racially discriminatory peremptory chal-
lenges from the jury selection process by limiting the trial attor-
ney's complete discretion over the challenge." This initial res-
6. See GOBERT, supra note 1. at 200 (stating that after an attorney challenges a juror for
cause, the trial judge has complete discretion whether to excuse the challenged juror). On appeal, the
judge's decision will be reversed only for an abuse of discretion or a clear misapplication of law. Id.
7. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 220 (explaining that the essential nature of the peremptory
challenge is that it is exercised by the attorney without providing a reason and without being subject
to the court's control).
8. See id. (quoting Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370,,376 (1892)) (asserting that the
peremptory challenge permits removal of a juror for real or imagined bias or sudden impressions of
partiality).
9. See GOBERT, supra note 1, at 271 (explaining that peremptory challenges allow an
attorney to remove persons who appear to be unfavorable towards the attorney's case even when
there is insufficient evidence of bias to justify a challenge for cause).
10. See id. (stating that after the trial judge has refused to remove a juror for cause, die trial
attorney may then avoid the possible bias resulting from having challenged that juror by using a
peremptory challenge to remove the questioned juror); infra notes 69-71.
11. See Batson v. Kentucky, 376 U.S. 79, 102-03 (1986) (Marshall, J., concurring) (declaring
that peremptory challenges are inherently racially discriminatory). Justice Marshall asserted that once
the Supreme Court invalidated state laws which prohibited African-Americans from serving on juries,
states turned to the peremptory challenge to keep African-Americans off juries. Id. at 103. See
Raymond J. Broderick, Why the Peremptory Challenge Should Be Abolished, 65 TMP. L. REV. 369,
370-75 (1992) (arguing that peremptory challenges are habitually employed to discriminate against
prospective jurors).
12. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 204 (declaring that racial discrimination injury selection not only
violates the Constitution but is also at odds with the basic concepts of democracy); id, at 220 (stating
that the peremptory challenge is not subject to the trial court's control).
1888
1993 / Georgia v. McCollum
triction led to the Supreme Court's 1986 decision in Batson v.
Kentucky 13 which narrowed the application of peremptory chal-
lenges by holding that the prosecution in a criminal case violates
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when it
exercises peremptory challenges based solely on the race of pro-
spective jurors. 4 The Supreme Court extended Batson in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.,'5 holding that civil liti-
gants are also prohibited from using their peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors based solely on their race.' 6 Recently, in Georgia
v. McCollum, 7 the Court extended the Batson limitation on per-
emptory challenges to criminal defendants. 8 The McCollum Court
held that a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges
constitutes state action, and thus, if the peremptory challenge is
racially discriminatory, it violates the Equal Protection Clause.' 9
This Note argues that the Supreme Court's decision in Georgia
v. McCollum,2' by subjecting the criminal defendant's peremptory
challenge to court control, denies the criminal defendant an impor-
tant tool in securing a fair and impartial jury.21 Part I of this Note
reviews the historical foundation and primary purposes of the per-
emptory challenge and outlines the legal foundation for the
Supreme Court's decision in Georgia v. McCollum. 22 Part II dis-
13. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
14. Id. at 92-93. The trial court will not question the reasons behind a peremptory challenge
unless the challenging party's opponent objects to the peremptory by asserting a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination. See infra notes 132-150 and accompanying text (providing a thorough
discussion of the Batson decision including the requirements for a prima facie case).
15. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
16. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077,2087 (1991) (holding that
civil litigants violate the Equal Protection Clause when they use their peremptory challenges to
exclude jurors based solely on their race), infra notes 188-212 and accompanying text (providingan
in-depth discussion of the Edmonson decision).
17. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
18. See Georgia v, McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,2359 (1992) (stating that criminal defendants
are subject to the equal protection mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment when using their
peremptory challenges).
19. M; see infra notes 217-298 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion and
analysis of the McCollum decision).
20. 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992).
21. See infra notes 336-413 and accompanying text (arguing that the McCollum decision lacks
a realistic assessment of the rights granted to the criminal defendant).
22. See infra notes 25-216 and accompanying text.
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cusses the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions in
McCollum.2 3 Finally, Part II examines the possible ramifications
of the McCollum decision.24
I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
The primary objective of the American jury selection process
is to impanel fair and impartial fact-finders.' In order to achieve
this objective, a preliminary examination of prospective jurors
called voir dire is conducted.26 During voir dire the trial judge or
the trial attorneys question prospective jurors to determine the
jurors' qualifications and suitability to serve on the jury.27 The
23. See infra notes 217-335 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 336-413 and accompanying text.
25. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the accused the right to be tried by an impartial
jury); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (granting all citizens the right to due process of law); Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-51 (1968) (incorporating the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment
right to an impartial jury into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thereby making
it binding against the states). The Jury Selection and Service Act of 1968 provides for both
mandatory exemptions from and minimum qualifications for jury service in federal trials. 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1862, 1863(b)(6) (1988). Under the Act, members of the armed forces, members of state or federal
police and fire departments, and state or federal public officers actively engaged in official duties are
barred from jury service. l § 1862 (1988). The qualifications for a potential juror under the Act
include: United States citizenship; an ability to speak English and to read, write and understand
English well enough to complete the juror qualification form; a lack of any mental or physical
infirmity that would prevent a person from rendering satisfactory jury service; and a lack of
convictions or pending charges for state or federal felony offenses. Id § 1863(b)(6) (1988).
26. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1575 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "voir dire" as the
preliminary examination of prospective jurors to determine their qualification and suitability to serve
as jurors); V. HALE STARR & MARK MCCORMICK, JURY SELECTION 39 (1985) (stating that in the
federal system the court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct voir dire or may do the
questioning themselves). When the court does the questioning, it must permit the parties to
supplement the inquiry with such additional questions as it deems proper. FED R. CRIM. P. 24(a);
FED. R. Civ. P. 47(a). See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., II1 S. Ct. 2077, 2084 (1991)
(explaining that most district court judges conduct the entire voir dire themselves); STARR &
MCCORMICK, supra, at 26 (stating that a 1977 survey of federal judges showed that 75% of the
judges excluded oral participation of counsel during voir dire).
27. See Stephen A. Saltzburg & Mary E. Powers, Peremptory Challenges and the Clash
Between Impartiality and Group Representation, 41 MD. L. REV. 337, 339 n.13 (1982) (describing
the various methods of conducting voir dire employed in the United States). Some jurisdictions allow
for juror questioning solely by the trial judge and others combine questioning by the judge with
questions from the trial attorneys. Id The permissible scope of the questioning also varies among
jurisdictions. Id. Some jurisdictions restrict voir dire questions to those that will provide a basis for
a challenge for cause while others allow questions having any relation to the exercise of challenges
for cause or peremptory challenges. Id. However, the trial judge has discretion to limit irrelevant or
1890
1993 / Georgia v. McCollum
information obtained during voir dire assists trial attorneys in deter-
mining how to use their jury challenges effectively to eliminate
biased jurors.'
A. Three Types of Jury Challenges and Their Application
There are three types ofjury challenges available to the trial
attorney: challenges to the array,29 challenges for cause,3" and
peremptory challenges.3 1 Although Georgia v. McCollum only add-
ressed the peremptory challenge, it is helpful to explain all three
challenges in order to illustrate McCollum's implications on the
jury selection process.
1. Challenge to the Array
The first type of jury challenge, the challenge to the array,
focuses on the process of selecting the entire jury panel.32 Chal-
insubstantial questioning. l Voir dire questions may be addressed to either the entire jury panel or
to the jurors individually. Id.; see Barbara A. Babcock, Voir Dire: Preserving "Its Wonderful
Power," 27 STAN. L. REV. 545, 547-48 (1975) (explaining that when voir dire questions are
addressed to the jury panel, the effect may be that some jurors fail to speak up for fear of speaking
in front of the other jurors or of disclosing personal feelings).
28. BLuE & SAGINAW, supra note 3, at § 2:01; see Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.
182, 188 (1981) (declaring that without adequate voir dire, the trial judge's responsibility to remove
prospective jurors who will not be able to impartially follow the court's instructions and evaluate the
evidence cannot be fulfilled); Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-20 (1965) (stating that attorneys
may ask probing questions during voir dire to ascertain bias and prejudice to assist them in exercising
jury challenges); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 47 (providing that the trial judge should have extensive
control over voir dire in the federal system in order to control the information that may be discovered
about a prospective juror, thereby affecting the litigants' exercise of challenges for cause and
peremptory challenges).
29. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 230 (6th ed. 1990) (defining "challenge to the array" as a
challenge that focuses on the illegality of drawing, selecting, or impaneling the jury).
30. See supra note 2 (defining the "challenge for cause"); see also Swain, 380 U.S. at 220
(explaining that the challenge for cause permits the exclusion of potential jurors who, based on
specific, provable, and legally accepted grounds, are unable to be impartial).
31. See supra note 1 (defining the "peremptory challenge"); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1966)
(granting peremptory challenges in federal civil trials); FED. R. CRIm. P. 24(b) (granting peremptory
challenges in federal criminal trials). Sequentially, an attorney should exercise a challenge to the array
first, followed by challenges for cause, and lastly, peremptory challenges. GOBERT, supra note 1, at
143-44.
32. BLUE & SAGINAW, supra note 3, at § 2:02 (providing a thorough discussion of the
challenge to the array).
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lenges to the array usually concentrate on a judicial defect or irreg-
ularity in the process of selecting the jurors. 33 A successful chal-
lenge to the array results in the entire jury being disqualifiedY3
This type of challenge is most often successful upon proof that the
state personnel responsible for compiling jury lists or calling jurors
have a significant interest in the outcome of the case.35
2. Challenge for Cause
The second type of jury challenge, the challenge for cause,
questions the partiality of an individual juror. 6 When challenging
a juror for cause, an attorney is required to state a specific, prov-
able and legally cognizable basis of partiality.37 Since the law pre-
sumes that jurors are impartial,38 the burden is on the party
33. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at 43 (defining the challenge to the array); see
also Irwin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 728 (1961) (disqualifying the jury, reversing a conviction of
murder and vacating a sentence of death where eight of 12 jurors had expressed during voir dire their
opinion as to the defendant's guilt of a crime which had been the subject of extensive pre-trial
publicity).
34. BLuE & SAGINAW, supra note 3, at § 2:02.
35. Id. Recently challenges to the array have focused on the fair cross-section requirement of
the Sixth Amendment. Id.; see U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the criminal defendant the right to
a jury drawn from a fair cross-section of the community); Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364
(1979) (holding that a prima facie violation of the Sixth Amendment requirement, that a jury be
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community, requires that the group allegedly excluded is
distinctive within the community, that this group's representation on the jury is not fair and
reasonable in relation to their number within the community, and this under-representation is caused
by the jury selection process).
36. See BLUE & SAGINAW, supra note 3, at § 2:03 (discussing the use of, and acceptable
reasons for, a challenge for cause).
37. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965) (stating that the challenge for cause
requires the attorney to state a legally recognized reason for the challenge). Under federal law in civil
cases, the challenge is divided into those for cause and those for favor. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1988). A
panelist who does not meet the statutory requirements for jury service is subject to a challenge for
cause. Id. A biased juror can be removed from the jury with a cause for favor. Id. In practice this
distinction has been lost and a challenge for cause suffices to disqualify a juror for bias or for failure
to meet statutory requirements. See Judge David Hittner & Eric J.R. Nichols, Jury Selection in
Federal Civil Litigation: General Procedures, New Rules, and the Arrival of Batson, 23 TEX, TECH.
L. RFv. 407, 424 (1992) (providing a detailed analysis of the challenge for cause in federal civil
trials).
38. See GOBERT, supra note 1, at 200-202 (discussing the procedure for exercising a challenge
for cause); see also Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 157 (1878) (stating the presumption of
a juror's impartiality is overcome only if the challenger is able to show the actual existence of a bias
in the mind of the juror).
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seeking to challenge a juror for cause to prove a legal basis for dis-
qualification.39 In order for a juror to be challenged for cause, the
attorney must establish, from information obtained during voir dire
questioning, that a particular juror is unable to objectively evaluate
and render a decision upon the facts of the case.' Since the par-
tiality of a juror successfully challenged for cause renders that juror
incompetent to serve on the jury, challenges for cause are unlimited
in number in the effort to eliminate all biased jurors.4" Generally,
the acceptable legal grounds for challenges for cause are set out by
statute,42 and include any quality that would prevent the juror
39. See GOBERT, supra note 1, at 201 (stating that the challenge for cause, unlike the
peremptory challenge, requires an attorney to articulate a basis for disqualification). It is tactically
advisable for an attorney to make a challenge for cause in chambers or at the bench, out of the
hearing of the jurors. L Challenging the juror in chambers avoids possible prejudice resulting from
the challenge on the part of the juror if the challenge is denied or bias on the part of the juror's
friends on the jury if the challenge is accepted. IL For this reason, many courts allow attorneys to
challenge jurors for cause anonymously by submitting a list of the jurors they seek to challenge to
the trial judge. Il.
40. See BLUE & SAGINAW, supra note 3, at § 2:03 (discussing the challenge for cause).
41. See GOBERT, supra note 1, at 193-94 (stating that challenges for cause are unlimited
because of the need to disqualify all impartial jurors in order that each party receive its constitutional
right to a fair and impartial jury); see also U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the accused the right
to a fair and impartial jury). Furthermore, in order to conserve judicial time and money and to avoid
confusion among jurors and the attorneys, challenges for cause should be exercised before the jury
is sworn. See BLUE & SAGINAW, supra note 3, at § 2:03 (explaining that, generally, a challenge for
cause that is not timely raised is deemed waived); GOBERT, supra note 1, at 202 (explaining that in
the pursuit of an impartial jury some courts permit attorneys to challenge a juror for cause after the
jury is sworn if the reason for the juror's disqualification was not discovered until after the jury was
empaneled).
42. See CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 229 (West 1992) (specifying that a few of the acceptable
reasons for a challenge for cause in either a criminal or civil case are: relation within the fourth
degree (e.g. first cousins) with any party, alleged victim or witness in the case at bar, standing in the
relation of or being a parent, spouse, child, guardian, conservator, employer or employee, landlord
or tenant, principal or agent, debtor or creditor, or business partner to any party; having served as a
grand juror on the case at bar, witness in previous action between the same parties, or grand juror
on any trial in which either party was the plaintiff or defendant in a civil action or defendant in a
criminal action; interest in the outcome of the case; having an unqualified opinion or belief as to the
merits of the case; having bias towards either party; and, if the offense is punishable by death, having
a conscientious objection to the death penalty that would preclude finding the defendant guilty); see
also ALA. CODE § 12-16-150 (1975); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-240 (1985); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.03
(West 1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-2018, 19-2019, 19-2020 (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. § 813.2 (West
1979); LA. CrV. CODE ANN. art. 1765 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 1301 (West
1980); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2006 (1989); N.Y. CODE CRim. PRoc. § 270.20 (Consol. 1982); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 15A-1212 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-14-06 (1991); S.D. CODIED LAWS ANN.
§ 15-14-6 (1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-3-102 (1980); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.180 (1988); WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 1-11-203 (1977) (stating the acceptable grounds for a challenge for cause in their
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from making an impartial decision.4" The most commonly
accepted grounds for challenges for cause are: a juror's inability to
follow the law;" jury service in a related case;45 a juror's
familial relationship with an attorney, witness or party to the liti-
gation;46 or a juror's financial interest in the outcome of the
case.
47
Once a legally proper cause for the challenge has been shown
by an attorney, excusal of the juror becomes a question of fact left
to the discretion of the trial judge.' The trial judge's ruling on a
challenge for cause is given broad deference on appeal because the
trial judge has had the opportunity to observe the juror's demeanor
during voir dire.49 This opportunity renders the trial judge in a
better position to assess the juror's credibility.50 A trial judge's
respective states).
43. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 198-200. Common law challenges for cause include relation to
the parties within the ninth degree (e.g. third cousins once removed), that the juror was a godfather
to a child of either party, or that the juror was master, servant, counselor, steward or attorney for
either party. Id. at 196; see id. (stating that at common law, jurors could also be challenged for cause
if they had already formed and declared an opinion about the case).
44. Id. at 196; see Morgan v. Illinois, 112 S. Ct. 2222, 2229 (1992) (holding that a juror who
would ever impose capital punishment is not impartial and may be challenged for cause); Brooks v.
Estelle, 697 F.2d 586,589 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that a juror was properly excused for cause when
the juror could not convict a defendant of murder when that defendant had not actually pulled the
trigger of the murder weapon).
45. GOBERT, supra note I, at 196; see Leonard v. United States, 378 U.S. 544, 545 (1964)
(per curiam) (holding that all jurors on a jury must be challenged for cause when the second jury
knew that the defendant was convicted in the first trial).
46. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 196; see Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430,433 (1887) (listing familial
relation among the reasons to challenge a juror for cause).
47. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 196; see Chestnut v. Ford Motor Co., 445 F.2d 967,971-72 (4th
Cir. 1971) (holding that in a lawsuit involving a company, a stockholder of that company is
incompetent to sit as a juror).
48. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 200; see Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025, 1036 (1984) (stating
that the factual question of whether a juror should be disqualified for cause is a twofold inquiry: first,
whether the juror stated under oath that they could set aside any outside opinions and decide the case
on the evidence presented during the trial; and second, whether the trial judge believed the juror's
protestation of impartiality).
49. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 200; see Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038 (stating that because the
extended voir dire proceedings are specifically designed to identify biased jurors and this
determination is essentially one of credibility, the trial judge is in the best position to make the
determination).
50. Patton, 467 U.S. at 1038.
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ruling on a challenge for cause will be reversed only for an abuse
of discretion or a misapplication of settled principles of law.51
The legally accepted grounds for challenges for cause have
been criticized as too narrow to eliminate all bias from the jury.52
This criticism points out that restrictive voir dire procedures,
including limitations on the right of counsel to question jurors
directly and limits on the scope of an attorney's inquiry," com-
bined with the narrow grounds for challenges for cause 4 make it
extremely difficult to discover whether prospective jurors have sub-
conscious biases that will affect their ability to be impartial.55 The
limited nature of the challenge for cause is one of the reasons trial
attorneys are granted peremptory challenges.56
3. The Peremptory Challenge
The third type of jury challenge available to the trial attorney
is the peremptory challenge.57 There are two critical differences
between peremptory challenges and challenges to the array and
challenges for cause.5" First, unlike challenges to the array and
challenges for cause, which must be based on statutorily defined
51. Id. (stating that the trial court's determination of a juror's credibility should be given great
deference by appeals courts); see Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 156 (1878) (declaring that
the finding of a trial court on the issue of a prospective juror's partiality should not be set aside by
a reviewing court unless the error is manifest).
52. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 27, at 340 (discussing the restrictive role of the
challenge for cause); see also Roger S. Kuhn, Jury Discrimination: The Next Phase, 41 S. CAL. L.
REV. 235, 243-44 (1968) (criticizing the challenge for cause as too narrow to eliminate bias from the
jury).
53. See Babcock, supra note 27, at 545 (providing a detailed description of the voir dire
process); supra notes 26-27 (discussing the different types of voir dire procedures and their effect
on the information obtained from the jurors).
54. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptable grounds for
challenging a juror for cause).
55. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 27, at 340 n.13 (stating that the method of conducting
voir dire has a significant effect on the amount of information available to the attorney in exercising
jury challenges); see also Babcock, supra note 27, at 547-48 (describing the effect of different voir
dire methods on the information obtained from jurors).
56. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 143.
57. Id. at 143; see supra note 1 (defining the peremptory challenge).
58. See GOBERT, supra note 1, at 270-78 (distinguishing the peremptory challenge from the
challenge for cause).
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justifications, no explanation is required when removing a pro-
spective juror with a peremptory challenge.5 9 The second differ-
ence is that unlike the first two types of jury challenges which are
unlimited in number, the number of peremptory challenges granted
to a litigant is fixed by statute.60 For example, under current
federal law the defendant is granted ten peremptory challenges and
the prosecution six, when a felony not punishable by death is
charged.6 ' For federal civil cases, each party is entitled to three
peremptory challenges.62 Most state statutes follow the basic
federal pattern in granting peremptory challenges; the number of
peremptory challenges allowed in civil cases is usually less than in
criminal cases and more peremptory challenges are granted for
more serious crimes.63
59. See id. at 270 (stating that ordinarily an attorney does not have to provide explanations
for peremptory challenges). The one exception to this rule occurs when a litigant establishes a prima
facie case that peremptory challenges have been exercised to exclude jurors based on their race. See
Batson v. Kentucky, 376 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986) (requiring that once a prima facie case of purposeful
discrimination has been demonstrated the prosecution must state a race-neutral explanation for its
peremptory challenges); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357 (1992) (applying the
Batson holding to criminal defendants); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077,
2080 (1991) (applying the Batson holding to civil litigants).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1966) (granting three peremptory challenges to each party in
federal civil trials); FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) (granting 20 peremptory challenges in federal criminal
trials where the possible punishment is the death penalty; three peremptories in misdemeanor cases;
and six to the prosecution and 10 to the defendant when a felony not punishable by death is charged).
61. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b); see id. (providing for court discretion to grant additional
peremptory challenges when more than one defendant is being tried before a single jury).
62. 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1966).
63. See CAL.. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 231 (West 1992) (allowing the prosecution and the
defendant 20 peremptory challenges each if the crime charged is punishable by life imprisonment or
death; six peremptories each if the crime charged is punishable by imprisonment for 90 days or less;
10 peremptories each for any criminal offense punishable by less than life but more than 90 days in
prison; and in civil cases each party is entitled to six peremptory challenges); see also ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-33-305 (Michie 1987); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-104 (1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-
82g (1985); D.C. CODE ANN. § 23-105 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 913.08 (West 1985); HAN,. REV.
STAT. § 635-30 (1985); IDAHO CODE § 19-2015, 19-2016, 19-2030 (1987); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 725,
para. 5/115-4 (1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-1-3, 35-37-1-4 (West 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §
813.2 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3412 (1988); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 799 fVest
1993); MD. CODE ANN., Crs. & JUD. PROC. § 8-301 (1989); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 234, § 29
(West 1986); MIcH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 768.12, 768.13 (West 1992); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-17-3
(1972); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 494A80 (Vernon 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-16-116 (1991); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 29-2005 (1989); NEv. REV. STAT. § 175.051 (1991); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 606:4
(1986); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 2A:78-7 (West 1993); N.Y. CRim. PROC. LAW § 270.25 (Consol. 1982);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1217 (1992); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.21 (Anderson 1987); OKLA,
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Since peremptory challenges are limited in number and require
no explanation, they are usually exercised after challenges to the
array and challenges for cause have failed.64 Due to the narrow
scope and judicial control over the challenge to the array and the
challenge for cause,65 many jurors suspected of bias which the
attorney unsuccessfully attempts to exclude will remain on the jury
panel.66 Furthermore, challenges for cause are often denied as
long as jurors state that they can put aside their bias and decide the
case impartially.67 Since peremptory challenges require no explan-
ation and are not judicially controlled, they allow for the removal
of jurors suspected of bias who were not able to be excluded under
a challenge to the array or a challenge for cause.68
The peremptory challenge also eliminates the possibility of bias
when used after a trial judge erroneously refuses to grant a liti-
gant's challenge for cause.69 A litigant who believes the judge has
made an incorrect ruling on a challenge for cause can remove the
juror in question through a peremptory challenge.70 Thus, because
the juror suspected of bias did not actually decide the defendant's
case, an appeal of the denial of the challenge for cause is unneces-
sary, therefore saving judicial time and money.71
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 655 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 136.230 (1987); S.C. CODE ANN. § 14-7-
1110 (Law. Co-op 1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-20-20 (1981); TENN. CODE ANN. § 22-3-
105 (1932); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 35.15 (West 1993); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.130
(1988); W. VA. CODE § 62-3-3 (1949); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 972.03 (West 1985); WYO. STAT. § 7-11-
103 (1985) (setting forth the number of peremptory challenges granted in each state).
64. See STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at 315 (discussing the order in which an
attorney should exercise jury challenges).
65. See supra notes 32-34, 36-46 and accompanying text (discussing the judicial control over
and narrow scope of the challenge to the array and the challenge for cause, respectively).
66. Babcock, supra note 27, at 549-50.
67. Id.
68. STARR & MCCORMICK, supra note 26, at 315; see Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,218-
19 (1965) (stating that peremptory challenges allow attorneys greater opportunity to discover bias
through probing questions during voir dire); id (explaining that peremptory challenges facilitate
challenges for cause because they allow the attorney to excuse a juror who became offended during
scrntinizing voir dire examination or after that juror was unsuccessfully challenged for cause).
69. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 271 (stating that the peremptory challenge's corrective function
permits an increased chance of removing partiality from the jury).
70. Id.; see Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88 (1988) (upholding a state statute permitting
a peremptory challenge to be used to cure a judge's incorrect refusal to excuse a juror for cause).
71. COBERT, supra note 1, at 271.
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By permitting the removal of jurors whose partiality is ques-
tioned, the peremptory challenge helps to ensure that the jurors
decide the case on the evidence placed before' them and not on an
improper basis or bias.7 2 Granting peremptory challenges pro-
motes the ideal that the jury should actually be, as well as appear
to be, fair and impartial to those whose interests are at stake.73
The important role that the peremptory challenge plays in elimi-
nating partiality from the jury is the reason it has been a part of the
jury selection process since the earliest use of juries.7 4
B. The Historical Evolution of the Peremptory Challenge
The peremptory challenge has very old credentials 75 and has
been used without inquiry into its basis for nearly as long as juries
have existed.76 One of the earliest statutes granting peremptory
challenges was enacted under Roman law in 104 B.C.77 This stat-
ute, the Lex Servilia, provided that the prosecution and the defense
would each select 100 jurors and that each side would then per-
emptorily remove fifty jurors so that a jury of 100 remained to try
the crime.78
72. Swain, 380 U.S at 219.
73. See id. (quoting In re Murchinson, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)) (stating that the function
of the peremptory challenge is to satisfy the appearance of justice); Babcock, supra note 27, at 552
(stating that the peremptory challenge teaches the litigant and the community that the jury is a good
and proper mode for deciding societal matters).
74. See Saltzburg & Powers, supra note 27, at 341 (stating that the Supreme Court considers
the peremptory challenge one of the most effective means of securing an impartial jury); see also
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894) (asserting that any system which prevents the full,
unrestricted exercise of the peremptory challenge must be condemned); Lewis v. United States, 146
U.S. 370, 376 (1892) (describing the peremptory challenge as a necessary element of trial by jury);
infra notes 75-106 and accompanying text (discussing the historical use of peremptory challenges).
75. Swain, 380 U.S. at 212. The Swain opinion contains a detailed review of the history of
the peremptory challenge. Id. at 212-19.
76. See Batson v. Kentucky, 376 U.S. 79, 119 (1986) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (stating that
peremptory challenges are nearly as old as juries themselves).
77. See id. (citing PETrINGAL, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE AND PRACnCE op JURIES AMONG
THE GREEKS AND ROMANS 115, 135 (1769), which discusses the ancient history of the peremptory
challenge).
78. Id& (citing PET'rINGA, AN ENQUIRY INTO THE USE AND PRACtiCE oF JURIES AMONG THE
GREKS AND RoMANs 115, 135 (1769), which states that the peremptory challenge was permitted
only in criminal cases).
1898
1993 / Georgia v. McCollum
Peremptory challenges were also used in the common law jury
system in England. 9 At common law, prior to the fourteenth cen-
tury, the criminal defendant was entitled to peremptorily challenge
thirty-five prospective jurors in felony trials.8° While originally
the peremptory challenge was only granted to the criminal defen-
dant, the Crown was later entitled to peremptorily challenge an
unlimited number of persons from the jury by asking jurors to
stand aside.8" Allowing the prosecution an unlimited number of
peremptory challenges resulted in significant delays and lengthened
trials because it required extensive juror questioning and the sum-
moning of a great number of jurors.82 Furthermore, it gave the
prosecution the ability to effectively handpick the jury.83
In an attempt to remedy this problem, Parliament passed the
Ordinance of Inquest'I in 1305, which rescinded the prosecution's
peremptory challenge.85  However, because the prosecution's
79. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 212 (discussing the common law history of the peremptory
challenge in England). The concept of trial by jury dates back to 1166 in the Assize of Claredon
which required that inquiries of robbery and murder be made by the 12 most lawful men. See 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNicA 348 (1985) (defining the Assize of Claredon as a series of ordinances
initiated by King Henry II of England attempting to improve the procedures in criminal law and
establishing the grand jury system consisting of 12 men).
80. LLOYDE.MOORE, THEJURY:TOOLOF KiNGs, PALLADUMoFLiBERTY54(1988) (stating
that where death was a possible punishment the defendant was entitled to 35 peremptory challenges).
Peremptory challenges were also allowed in trials where death was not a possible punishment. See
Gray v. Regina, 11 Cl. & Fin. 427, 450 (H.L. 1844) (allowing peremptory challenges in a trial for
a felony not punishable by death). Blackstone noted that granting the peremptory challenge to the
criminal defendant demonstrated the tenderness and humanity of English law. 4 WILLIAM
BLAcEsToNE, COmENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809). However, common law did not grant the
peremptory challenge to civil litigants. See Creed v. Fisher, 23 Li. Ex. 143, 144 (1853) (holding that
peremptory challenges were not allowed in civil trials).
81. MOORE, supra note 80, at 54.
82. COKE ON LITIGATION 156 (14th ed. 1791) (stating that the prosecution's unlimited number
of peremptory challenges led to infinite delays and danger of unfairness to the defendant).
83. MORE, supra note 80, at 54.
84. See 33 Edw. 1, Stat. 4 (1305) (proclaiming that the prosecution must assign a certain cause
to their challenge and that the truth of the challenge shall be inquired of according to the custom of
the Court).
85. Id. The defendant's right to the peremptory challenge remained unaltered by this
ordinance. I. However, beginning in 1530 the English Parliament began to erode the criminal
defendant's peremptory challenge by reducing the number of challenges from 35 to 20 in all cases
except high treason. Y.B. 22 Hen. 8, fo. 14, pl. 6 (1530). In 1825, the number was reduced to only
seven. Y.B. 6 Geo. 4, fo. 50, pl. 29 (1825). Eventually, in 1988, the criminal defendant's right to
peremptory challenge was abolished in England. Criminal Justice Act 1988 § 118.
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power to remove jurors was so entrenched in the jury selection pro-
cess, the English courts interpreted the ordinance to allow the pro-
secution to continue to eliminate jurors by asking them to stand
aside.86 When the prosecution asked a juror to stand aside, that
juror would be excused from jury service unless after all jurors
were questioned there was an insufficient number of jurors to com-
pose a jury.87 If vacant seats on the jury remained, the jurors who
had been asked to stand aside would fill them unless at that time
the prosecution was able to show proper cause for their dismis-
sal.88 If the prosecution could not show proper cause, the jurors
were seated on the jury over the prosecution's stand aside
objection.89
The English common law provided the foundation for the jury
selection system that developed in the United States.90 An early
act of Congress in 179091 granted criminal defendants thirty-five
peremptory challenges in trials for treason and twenty in trials for
felonies punishable by death.92 Since the peremptory challenge
was considered primarily a device to protect defendants, Congress
did not grant them to the government until 1865.' 3 When they
86. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 213 (1965). The prosecutor's right to ask a juror to
stand aside was liberally construed. Id. at 213 n.l1. All attempts to limit or abolish this right were
rejected. l
87. See GOBERT, supra note 1, at 270 (discussing the stand aside system used by the
prosecution in English courts).
88. Id; see Mansell v. Reg., 8 El. & BI. 54, 73 (1857) (holding that the prosecution is not
required to assign a cause until all the names appearing on the jury panel have been called); Rex v.
Parry, 7 Car. & P. 836, 837 (1837) (stating the Crown has the right to set aside any juror when called
and is not required to assign a cause until it appears that there cannot be a full jury).
89. Swain, 380 U.S. at 213; see id. at 213 n.12 (stating that current English law continues to
allow the prosecution to use the stand aside system).
90. Id. at 214. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 376 U.S. 79, 119-20 (1986) (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (reviewing the common law and statutory history of the peremptory challenge in the
United States).
91. See I Stat. 119 (1790) (granting peremptory challenges in federal criminal trials).
92. Id.; see Swain, 380 U.S. at 214 (stating that the 1790 statute granting peremptory
challenges did not address the government's right to a peremptory challenge); see also id. (discussing
the number of peremptory challenges granted to the criminal defendant throughout early American
legal history).
93. See 13 Stat. 500 (1865) (granting peremptory challenges to the prosecution in a federal
criminal trial); Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68, 70-71 (1887) (upholding the constitutionality of the
prosecution's peremptory challenge, stating that peremptory challenges assist in producing an
impartial jury).
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were finally permitted, the prosecution was only granted five per-
emptory challenges while the defendant retained twenty.94
The individual states tended to parallel the federal peremptory
challenge system.95 Typically, state granted peremptory challenges
were conferred upon the defendant by statute.96 The number of
peremptory challenges granted to the defendant by statute often
corresponded to the federal system. 7 Also, as in the federal
system, most states had enacted statutes granting peremptory chal-
lenges to the prosecution by 1870.
98
While granting peremptory challenges to the defendant was
widely accepted, allowing the prosecution to use peremptory chal-
lenges was controversial. 9 In Hayes v. Missouri,10t the constitu-
tionality of a Missouri statute granting the prosecution peremptory
challenges was questioned under the Equal Protection Clause."'1
The Missouri statute granted fifteen peremptory challenges to the
prosecution in a capital case in a city with over 100,000 inhabit-
ants, but only eight in lesser populated areas. 02 The Supreme
94. 13 Stat 500 (1865). In 1872, the defendant was granted 10 peremptory challenges and the
government three in all felonies not punishable by death. 17 Stat. 282 (1872). This right was
extended to allow each side three peremptory challenges in both misdemeanor and civil trials. Id.
Current federal law grants the prosecution and the defense 20 peremptory challenges each in capital
cases and three each in misdemeanor cases. FED. R. CRIm. P. 24(b). Presently, in a non-capital felony
prosecution, the defendant is granted 10 peremptory challenges and the prosecution six. U,4
95. Swain, 380 U.S. at 215.
96. 1i.; see supra note 63 (citing current state statutes granting peremptory challenges).
97. Compare supra note 94 (stating that in 1865 federal law granted the defendant 20
peremptory challenges) with People v. McQuade, 18 N.E. 156, 158-59 (N.Y. 1888) (citing a New
York statute allowing the defendant 20 peremptory challenges in a case for murder or a felony
punishable by 10 years in prison); compare supra note 92 (stating that federal law prior to 1865
granted the defendant 35 peremptory challenges) with State v. Humphreys, 1 Tenn. 306 (1808) (citing
a Tennessee statute stating that when the possible punishment is death, the defendant is entitled to
35 peremptory challenges).
98. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 215 n.18 (citing state statutes that granted the prosecution
peremptory challenges in 1870).
99. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 242 (Goldberg, J., dissenting) (asserting that granting peremptory
challenges to the prosecution is unwarranted and unnecessary); see also Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S.
68, 71-72 (1887) (reviewing the constitutionality of granting peremptory challenges to the
prosecution).
100. 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
101. Id. at 70. In Hayes, the defendant moved to limit the prosecution's number of peremptory
challenges to eight. Id After the trial court rejected the prosecution's motion, the prosecution
removed 15 of the 47 qualified jurors with peremptory challenges. Id
102. See id. at 68 (citing REV. ST. Mo. §§ 1900-1902).
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Court specifically upheld granting the prosecution's peremptory
challenge because the Court believed it assisted in impaneling an
impartial jury."03 Following this early debate, federal0 4 and
state courts'0 5 have continued to question and, in effect, erode the
use of peremptory challenges.'06
103. See Hayes, 120 U.S. at 71 (stating that the legislature has discretion over the number of
peremptory challenges granted as long they fulfill their function of empaneling an impartial jury). The
Court held that granting more peremptory challenges may be the only means of ensuring an impartial
jury in larger cities. Id. at 72.
104. Since Hayes, federal courts have placed equal protection restrictions on peremptory
challenges. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (subjecting the criminal
defendant's peremptory challenge to the equal protection clause); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete
Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2070, 2080 (1991) (subjecting civil litigants' peremptory challenges to the equal
protection clause); Batson v. Kentucky, 376 U.S. 79, 92-93 (1986) (subjecting the prosecutor's
peremptory challenge to the equal protection clause).
105. Some state courts have limited peremptory challenges based on their own state
constitutions. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 277, 583 P.2d 748, 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
903 (1978) (holding that the use of peremptory challenges by either the prosecution or the defendant
to remove prospective jurors on the sole ground of group bias violates the right to a trial by jury
drawn from a fair cross-section of the community under the California Constitution, CAL. CONST. art.
1, § 16); Riley v. State, 496 A.2d 997, 1009-13 (Del. 1985) (holding that the prosecution's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude jurors solely because of their race violates the defendant's right to
an impartial jury under the Delaware Constitution, DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7); State v. Neil, 457 So.
2d 481, 486 (Fla. 1984) (holding the prosecution's racially discriminatory peremptory challenges
violate the defendant's right to an impartial jury under the Florida Constitution, FLA. CONST. art. 1,
§ 16); Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, 515 (Mass.) (holding that when the prosecution
excludes persons from the jury because of their particular group affiliation, it violates the defendant's
right to an impartial jury under the Massachusetts Constitution, MASS. CONsT. pt. 1, art. 12) cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Kern, 554 N.E.2d 1235, 1241 (N.Y. 1990) (holding that the
prosecution's racially discriminatory peremptory challenges violate the New York Constitution, N.Y.
CONST. art 1, § 1).
106. See supra notes 104-105 (citing the cases which have restricted the unfettered use of
peremptory challenges). Numerous law review articles have also been written on the use of
peremptory challenges. See, e.g., Michael N. Chesney & Gerard T. Gallagher, State Action and the
Peremptory Challenge: Evolution of the Court's Treatment and Implications for Georgia V.
McCollum, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1049 (1992); E. Vaughn Dunnigan, Discrimination by the
Defense: Peremptory Challenges After Batson v. Kentucky, 88 COLuM. L. REV. 355 (1988);
Katherine Goldwasser, Limiting a CriminalDefendant's Use of Peremptory Challenges: On Symmetry
and the Jury in a Criminal Trial, 102 HARV. L. REV. 808 (1989); Brent J. Gurney, The Case for
Abolishing Peremptory Challenges in Criminal Trials, 21 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 227 (1986);
Michael M. Raeber, Toward An Integrated Rule Prohibiting All Race-Based Peremptory Challenges:
Some Considerations on Georgia v. McCollum, 26 GA. L. REV. 503 (1992);
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C. Legal Erosion of the Peremptory Challenge
In Swain v. Alabama," the Supreme Court took its first step
in the process of eroding the unfettered use of peremptory chal-
lenges. 08 The defendant in Swain, an African-American youth,
was charged with raping a seventeen year old white girl in
Talladega County, Alabama.'0 9 At trial, the prosecution used per-
emptory challenges to exclude all African-Americans from the
jury." The defendant was tried and convicted by an all-white
jury.' On appeal, the defendant based his argument on the
Supreme Court's decision in Strauder v. West Virginia."2 In
Strauder, the Supreme Court held that the purposeful exclusion of
jurors of the defendant's race from the jury violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 3 Relying on
Strauder, the defendant exercised a challenge to the array, arguing
that his jury was selected in a racially discriminatory manner in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause."'
In Swain, the question before the United States Supreme Court
was whether an African-American defendant was denied equal pro-
tection when the prosecution used peremptory challenges to
107. 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
108. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202,222-24 (1965) (holding that if a prosecutor excluded
African-Americans from the jury in case after case a presumption of purposeful discrimination would
arise).
109. Swain v. Alabama, 156 So. 2d 368, 370 (Ala. 1963), aft'd 380 U.S. 202 (1965).
110. Swain, 380 U.S. at 205. Eight prospective African-American jurors were called for jury
service. Il Two were exempt and the other six were peremptorily struck by the prosecution. Id
111. Id. The defendant was sentenced to death. Swain v. State, 156 So. 2d at 369.
112. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (declaring that no state shall deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 310 (1879)
(recognizing the crininal defendant's right not to be tried by a jury from which members of the
defendant's race have been purposefully excluded). The Strauder decision laid the foundation for the
Supreme Court to erode peremptory challenges by subjecting them to the Equal Protection Clause.
See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 85 (1986) (citing Strauder as the foundation case for the
Batson decision).
114. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203. The trial court denied the motion and the Alabama Supreme Court
affirmed the conviction. Swain v. State, 156 So. 2d 368 (Ala. 1963).
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exclude all the members of the defendant's race from the jury."-
The Court began its decision by noting the extensive common law
and statutory history of the peremptory challenge" 6  and the
important role of peremptory challenges in achieving an impartial
jury.n 7 Next, the Swain Court refused to find that the striking of
the African-American jurors in the defendant's particular case vio-
lated the Equal Protection Clause because such a restriction would
radically change the nature and operation of the peremptory chal-
lenge." 8 Particularly, the Court explained that it is essential to
the nature of the peremptory challenge that it be exercised without
stating a reason." 9 The Court asserted that if explanations for
using peremptory challenges were required under the Equal
Protection Clause, the challenge would no longer be per-
emptory.120
Instead of requiring explanations for peremptory challenges, the
Swain Court delineated a test which presumed that the prosecutor's
motive in using the peremptory challenge was to obtain a fair and
impartial jury." This presumption could be overcome by
evidence that the peremptory system as a whole was being
corrupted by the prosecution's discriminatory peremptory
challenges in case after case.12 2 However, the Swain test was
criticized as too stringent to effectively protect the rights of the
115. Swain, 380 U.S. at 221. The defendant in Swain was unable to challenge the jury under
the Sixth Amendment fair-cross section requirement because the Sixth Amendment did not become
applicable to the states until three years after Swain was decided. See U.S. CONST. amend VI
(granting the accused the right to an impartial jury); supra note 25 (discussing the Sixth Amendment
cross-section requirement); see also Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1968) (holding that
the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury is binding upon the States).
116. Swain, 380 U.S at 212-17; see supra notes 75-106 and accompanying text (reviewing the
history of the peremptory challenge).
117. See Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (referring to the peremptory challenge as essential to trial by
jury).
118. lid at 221-22.
119. Id. at 222.
120. Id. (stating that the prosecutor's judgment underlying each peremptory challenge would
be open to scrutiny for reasonableness and sincerity).
121. Id This presumption was later overruled in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986).
See infra notes 143-150 and accompanying text (discussing the evidentiary burden delineated in
Batson).
122. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224. To preserve the capricious nature of the peremptory challenge,
the Court declined to inquire into the prosecutor's motivations for every single challenge. Id. at 222.
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criminal defendant. 23 Much of this criticism pointed out the
practically insurmountable burden placed upon the criminal
defendant.1 24  For example, under the Swain test, an African-
American defendant could establish a prima facie case of
purposeful discrimination only by showing that the prosecutor was
using racially motivated peremptory challenges in case after
case.125 The Swain burden was extremely difficult for the
criminal defendant to meet because it required defendants to show
a prosecutor's previous conduct over an indefinite amount of time,
in trials in which they were not involved and of which the defen-
dants could not easily obtain records.126 In order to achieve this
arduous task, defendants would have to investigate, over a number
of cases, the race of the persons tried in the particular jurisdiction,
the racial composition of the venire and the jury, and the manner
in which both parties exercised their peremptory challenges.127 In
jurisdictions where court records do not contain the juror's race or
where voir dire proceedings are not transcribed, this burden will be
impossible for the defendant to meet. 128 Furthermore, the
123. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 279; see, e.g., Frederick L. Brown et al., The Peremptory
Challenge as a Manipulative Device in Criminal Trials: Traditional Use or Abuse, 14 NEW ENG. L.
REv. 192 (1978); John A. Martin, The Fifth Circuit and Jury Selection Cases: The Negro Defendant
and His Peerless Jury, 4 Hotus. L. REv. 448 (1966) (criticizing the evidentiary standard of Swain);
Comment, Swain v. Alabama: A Constitutional Blueprint for the Perpetuation of the All-White Jury.
52 VA. L. REV. 1157, 1163 (1966) [hereinafter Comment, Blueprint for All-White Jury].
124. Comment, Blueprint for All-White Jury, supra note 123, at 1161; see Batson, 476 U.S. at
92-93 (stating that the impossibility of the defendant's burden under Swain often resulted in the
prosecution's peremptory challenges being immune from constitutional scrutiny).
125. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (stating that the presumption of non-discrimination would be
overcome only if the purposes behind the peremptory challenge were being corrupted).
126. See Comment, Blueprint for All-White Jury, supra note 123, at 1161 (explaining that
problems of evidentiary logistics, time pressures, and lack of records prevented the defendant from
meeting the Swain standard).
127. United States v. Pearson, 448 F.2d 1207, 1217 (5th Cir. 1971) (concluding that because
of economic and time restraints coupled with the unavailability of information, most criminal
defendants would be unable to meet the Swain burden).
128. See People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258,285-86, 583 P.2d 748,767-68, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890,
908-09 (1978) (noting that in the state of California there has never been a criminal defendant who
has attempted to comply with the Swain burden and succeeded). A review of the attempts by criminal
defendant's to meet the Swain burden in federal and state courts revealed that in the 10 years after
Swain was decided no defendant was successful in proving purposeful discrimination by the
prosecution. Annotation, Use of Peremptory Challenge to Exchide from the Jury Persons Belonging
to a Class or Race, 79 A.L.R. 3d 14, 24, 56-73 (1979). But see State v. Brown, 371 So. 2d 751 (La.
1905
Pacific Law Journal / VoL 24
stringency of this burden is illustrated by the Swain facts them-
selves. 29 Even though the defendant was able to prove that no
African-American person had served on a jury in Talladega County
in fifteen years, the Court concluded that the defendant failed to
meet his burden of proof.130
Despite this criticism, the Swain standard for proving purpose-
ful discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges remained in
effect until 1986 when the United States Supreme Court decided
Batson v. Kentucky.13 1 In Batson, the defendant, an African-
American male, was indicted in Kentucky for second-degree burg-
lary and receipt of stolen goods.132 During voir dire, the pro-
secutor used peremptory challenges to remove the only four
African-American persons on the venire, resulting in an all-white
jury.133 The defendant challenged the array, arguing that the pro-
secution's actions violated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury
composed of a fair cross-section of the community"M and his
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the laws. 3 '
The Kentucky Supreme Court denied the defendant's motions,
holding that the defendant had not proved the systematic exclusion
of members of his race from the jury, as required under the Swain
test. 36 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
1979) (holding that the defendant made a sufficient showing to establish a prima facie case of
discrimination).
129. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 203-04 (1965); see supra note 109-114 and
accompanying text (discussing the factual background of Swain).
130. Swain, 380 U.S at 226.
131. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
132. Id. at 82.
133. L at 83.
134. d; see U.S. CONST. amend VI (granting the accused the right to a trial by an impartial
jury chosen from a fair cross-section of the State and district where the crime was committed);
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 150-51 (1968) (holding that the Sixth Amendment is binding
upon the states).
135. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83; see U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (granting all citizens equal
protection of the laws). The trial judge denied both motions stating that the parties were entitled to
remove any juror they wanted to and that the fair cross-section requirement applied only to the
selection of the jury panel and not the trial jury. Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
136. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84. The Kentucky Supreme Court expressly refused to follow the
reasoning of People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 277, 583 P.2d 748, 762, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890, 903
(1978), and Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E. 2d 499,515, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979), both
of which rejected the systematic exclusion rule ofSwain. Id; see supra note 105 (stating the holdings
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Batson to re-examine the systematic exclusion burden of
Swain.137
In Batson, the Supreme Court began its opinion by reaffirming
the principle that purposeful discrimination against African-
Americans in the jury selection process violated the equal pro-
tection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment. 138 Next, the
majority rejected the defendant's challenge to the array, which
alleged a violation of the Sixth Amendment's cross-section require-
ment.139 The Court stated that although criminal defendants have
the right not to have members of their race excluded from the jury,
they do not have a right to be tried by a jury containing persons of
their race." The Batson Court then went on to reject the eviden-
tiary standard of Swain, which required a showing of systematic
exclusion, stating that it placed a crippling burden of proof on the
defendant. 41 After overruling the Swain standard, the Batson
Court created a new standard in which a criminal defendant could
establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination based
of both Wheeler and Soares).
137. Batson, 476 U.S. at 93 (stating that the evidentiary burden of Swain is inconsistent with
the Equal Protection Clause because it does not allow a defendant to prove purposeful discrimination
relying solely on the peremptory challenges exercised in the defendant's case).
138. I, at 84. Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices Brennan,
White, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, and O'Connor. Id at 81. Justices White, Marshall and
O'Connor each filed separate concurring opinions. Id. at 100 (White, J., concurring); id. at 102
(Marshall, J., concurring); id. at 111 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice Stevens filed a concurring
opinion in which Justice Brennan joined. Id. at 108 (Stevens, J., concurring). Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Rehnquist each filed separate dissenting opinions. Id. at 112 (Burger, CJ., dissenting);
id at 134 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. L at 84; see supra note 134 and accompanying text (citing the Sixth Amendment and the
cross-sectional requirement).
140. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 85 (stating that the number of races and nationalities in our
country prevents guaranteeing that every trial will contain a juror of the defendant's race or
nationality); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (stating that although the Sixth
Amendment guarantees that a defendant's jury will be selected from a representative cross-section
of the community, it would be impossible to have a jury of 12 persons reflect the proportion of each
of the various distinctive groups with our society).
141. Batsoq, 476 U.S. at 92-93.
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solely on evidence of the prosecutor's discriminatory peremptory
challenges at the defendant's trial. 142
1. The Batson Test
The Batson Court replaced the systematic exclusion burden of
Swain with a new three part test for establishing a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination.143 Under the first part of the Batson
test, the defendant must be a member of a cognizable racial group
and prove that the prosecution has exercised peremptory challenges
to remove persons of the defendant's race from the jury."
Second, the defendant must show that the facts and relevant cir-
cumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used peremptory
challenges to remove jurors because of their race.145 In raising
this inference, the Batson test allows the defendant to rely upon the
presumption that the peremptory challenge is a jury selection pro-
cedure which gives litigants who wish to discriminate the oppor-
tunity to discriminate.' s Next, the Batson test requires that once
the defendant has established a prima facie case of purposeful dis-
crimination, the burden shifts to the prosecution to come forward
142. l at 95. The Supreme Court noted that several state courts, interpreting their state's
constitution, had accepted the view that peremptory challenges used to strike black jurors in the
defendant's particular case were unconstitutional. Id. at 82 n.1; see supra note 105 (citing these state
court decisions).
143. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96.
144. d; see id n.19 (stating that defendants may make out a prima facie case by proving that
in a particular jurisdiction members of their race have not been summoned for jury service over an
extended period of time or proof that members of the defendant's race have been systematically
excluded from the venire). However, at least one lower court has refused to extend Batson to
peremptory challenges based on ethnicity. See United States v. Campione, 942 F.2d 429, 432-33 (7th
Cir. 1991) (holding that an Italian-American defendant failed to establish that two Italian-American
surnamed jurors were members a cognizable racial group).
145. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96; see id at 97 (stating that a pattern of strikes against African-
American jurors as well as questions and statements made by the prosecutor during voir dire might
lead to an inference of purposeful discrimination).
146. Id. at 96; see Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559, 563 (1953) (stating that the defendant is
not required to prove a particular act of discrimination by a particular official responsible for the
selection of the jury).
1908
1993 / Georgia v. McCollum
with a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge.147
The Batson Court explained that this explanation need not rise to
the level required for challenges for cause.148 However, the Court
warned that the peremptory challenge cannot be based on the
assumption that because of the juror's shared race with the defen-
dant, the juror is incapable of remaining impartial.149 The Court
stated that it would not specify an exact amount of proof required
under the Batson test, but would defer this decision to trial courts
because of their more capable experience with voir dire.15
2. Extending the Batson Holding
The specific holding of Batson is that a prosecutor cannot pur-
posefully use peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans
from a jury when the defendant is African-American. 51 Recently,
the Supreme Court extended Batson in two ways.1 52 First, in
Powers v. Ohio,15 3 the Court eliminated the Batson requirement
147. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. The Supreme Court gave little guidance to lower courts in defining
acceptable race-neutral explanations. See id. at 99 (stating that the Court declined to formulate
particular procedures in light of the variety of different jury selection procedures followed in the state
and federal courts). Hence, reasons found acceptable in one case in a jurisdiction may not be
sustained in another case in the same jurisdiction. Compare Daniels v. State, 768 S.W.2d 314 ('ex.
App. 1988) (rejecting the explanation that the challenged jurors were inattentive and gave more
attention to the defense counsel) with Campbell v. State, 775 S.W.2d 419 (Tex. App. 1989)
(accepting the argument that the juror was inattentive to the prosecution and gave more attention to
the defense counsel as a race-neutral explanation).
148. See supra notes 42-47 and accompanying text (discussing the acceptable explanations for
challenges for cause).
149. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97. An example of a race-neutral explanation given by the prosecution
that has been accepted by the Supreme Court was the concern that a Hispanic juror who could not
understand English would not listen to and be able to follow an interpreter. Hernandez v. New York,
Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991).
150. Batson, 476 U.S. at 99. This aspect of the Batson decision has been criticized as
lengthening the jury selection process by requiring trial judge's to hold Batson hearings during voir
dire. See Albert L. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury: Voir Dire, Peremptory Challenges
and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 156-57 (1989) (arguing that Batson creates
seven additional areas of litigation).
151. Batson, 476 U.S at 92-93.
152. See Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370-71 (1991) (extending Batson to allow
defendants of one race third-party standing to challenge the purposeful exclusion of jurors of another
race); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2087 (1991) (extending Batson to
civil litigants).
153. 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991).
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that the defendant and the excluded juror share the same race.14
Second, in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 5 5 the Court
extended Batson to civil litigants, holding that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits civil litigants from exercising their peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner.156
a. Powers v. Ohio: Allowing Defendants of One Race
Third-Party Standing to Assert the Rights of
Excluded Jurors of Another Race
In Powers, the Supreme Court declared that the equal protection
restrictions of Batson were intended to protect both the defendant
and the excluded jurors from the harms caused by purposeful dis-
crimination.1 57 The Powers Court stdted that purposeful discri-
mination injury selection denies defendants their Sixth Amendment
right to impartial juries.'58 Furthermore, purposeful discrimination
also harms the excluded jurors by ignoring their individual qualifi-
cations and abilities and instead judging them based on the false
assumption that they will be biased because of their race. 59 The
Court asserted that these harms extend beyond the defendant and
the excluded jurors and affect the entire community.' 6  The
Powers Court explained that discriminatory selection procedures
undermine the public confidence in our jury system and cast doubt
upon the fairness of jury verdicts. 6' Therefore, unlike Batson in
154. Id. at 1370-71.
155. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
156. Id. at 2087.
157. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1368. In Powers, a white male was indicted for aggravated murder.
l at 1366. During jury selection, the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to remove seven
African-Americans from the jury. L The defendant objected under Batson. Id The trial court denied
the defendant's motion and the defendant was convicted. l The Ohio Court of Appeals affirmed the
defendant's conviction. L
158. L at 1370.
159. l (stating that an individual does not have a right to sit on any particular jury but does
possess the right not to be excluded from a jury because of race); see Thiel v. Southern Pacific Co.,
328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946) (stating that a person's race is unrelated to his competence to serve as a
juror).
160. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1370.
161. Il at 1372 (stating that one purpose of the jury system is to impress upon the criminal
defendant and the community as a whole that the verdict reached is fair and just).
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which the Court based its holding on the equal protection rights of
the defendant, the Powers Court held that individual jurors and the
community deserve equal protection from discriminatory per-
emptory challenges.162
Next, the Powers Court held that the defendant had third-party
standing to assert the equal protection rights of excluded
jurors.' 63 Ordinarily, litigants must assert their own legal rights
and cannot seek relief for an injury done to a third party."&I How-
ever, the Supreme Court allows litigants to bring actions on behalf
of third parties if the litigant: has suffered an injury giving the liti-
gant a sufficient interest in the outcome of the case, 65 has a
close relation to the third party, and the third party is hindered in
protecting the third party's own interests." 5
Under the first part of the third-party standing test, the Powers
Court analyzed whether the defendant had suffered a cognizable
injury.167 The Court explained that discriminatory peremptory
challenges threaten the defendant's chance of being tried by an
impartial jury.168 Particularly, the Court asserted that the defen-
dant is injured because discriminatory jury selection procedures
cast doubt upon the integrity of the judicial process and question
162. Id. at 1370; Batson, 476 U.S. at 87.
163. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1373.
164. Id at 1370 (citing United States Dept. of Labor v. Triplett, 110 S. CL 1428 (1990)).
165. d
166. Id. at 1370-71; see Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 115 (1978) (stating that in order to
qualify for third-party standing the relationship between the litigant and the third party must render
the litigant just as effective a proponent of the right as the third party would have been). The"
Supreme Court has found these criteria satisfied in a number of cases. See, e.g., United States Dept.
of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 722 (1990) (holding that an attorney may challenge an opposing
counsel's attorney's fees by asserting the due process rights of a client); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976) (holding that a licensed beer vendor has standing to raise the equal protection claim
of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the
age of 21 and to females under the age of 18); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 481 (1965)
(holding that Planned Parenthood officials and licensed physicians can raise the constitutional rights
of married contraceptive users with whom they had professional relationships).
167. Powers, 111 S. Ct at 1371.
168. Id.; see Allen v. Hardy, 478 U.S. 255, 259 (1986) (per curiam) (recognizing that the
defendant has an interest in neutral jury selection procedures); see also Rosales-Lopez v. United
States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981) (stating that jury selection is the primary means by which a court
may enforce a defendant's right to be tried by a jury free from ethnic, racial or political prejudice).
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the fairness of the defendant's trial. 169 Thus, the Powers Court
concluded that the defendant suffered an injury that satisfied the
first part of the third party standing test.170
Second, the Powers Court assessed whether the relation
between the defendant and the excluded juror was sufficiently close
to ensure that the juror's rights would be vigorously and effectively
advocated by the defendant.1 71 The Court determined that the
excluded juror and the defendant had a common interest in elimi-
nating racial discrimination from the courtroom. 72 Jurors rejected
because of their race suffer public humiliation which may cause
them to lose confidence in the court and its verdicts.173 Such dis-
crimination also erodes the confidence of defendants in the system
that will try their case. 74 Furthermore, the defendant will be a
motivated and effective advocate because the prosecution's vio-
lation of the juror's equal protection rights could lead to a reversal
of the defendant's conviction. 75 Therefore, the Powers Court
concluded that the interests shared by the defendant and the
excluded juror created a sufficiently close relationship to qualify
the defendant for third-party standing.176
The final determination necessary under the third-party standing
test is whether the excluded jurors are deterred from asserting their
169. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1371; see id. (stating that active discrimination by a prosecutor
during the jury selection process condones violations of the United States Constitution within the very
institution entrusted with its enforcement, inviting cynicism about the jury's neutrality and the
government's obligations to obey the law); id. at 1372 (stating that the purpose of the jury system
is to impress upon the criminal defendant and the community that a verdict or acquittal is fair); see
id. (stating that the jury's verdict will not be accepted by the community as fair if the jury is chosen
by unlawful means). Therefore, racial discrimination in jury selection undermines the state's interest
in promoting acceptance of jury verdicts as fair decisions made by impartial persons. Id.
170. Id at 1371.
171. Id
172. Id. at 1372.
173. See id. (stating that the humiliation of racial discrimination is compounded when it occurs
in public during voir dire).
174. Id
175. See id. (stating that there is no doubt that the defendant will be a motivated and effective
advocate of the excluded juror's rights); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1996) (stating that
if the defendant establishes a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination and the prosecution does
not come forward with a race neutral explanation for the peremptory challenge, the defendant's
conviction will be reversed).
176. Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1372.
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own equal protection rights.177 The Powers Court explained that
the practical and financial barriers of litigation will discourage
excluded jurors from asserting their own rights.178 Since jurors
are not parties to the jury selection process, they have no oppor-
tunity to be heard at the time of their exclusion. 179 Thus, in order
for the jurors to protect their own interests, they would have to
bring their own action which can be very costly as well as time
consuming.18 Additionally, the Powers Court determined that
due to the economic burdens of litigation, jurors are further
deterred by the relatively small financial stake in bringing their
own actions."' Thus, the Powers Court concluded that: the
criminal defendant suffers an injury sufficient to ensure vehement
litigation of the juror's rights, the juror and the defendant share the
interest in achieving an impartial jury, and the jurors themselves
are unlikely to vindicate their own rights, and therefore, the
criminal defendant qualifies for third-party standing and may assert
the equal protection rights of the excluded jurors. 2
In Batson and Powers, the Supreme Court prohibited the pro-
secution from using peremptory challenges to discriminate based
on race. 183 However, the question of whether this requirement
also applied to civil litigants and criminal defendants was left
unanswered by the Court.1" The Supreme Court resolved the first
of these unanswered questions concerning civil litigants in
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.185
177. Id.
178. Id at 1372-73. Although an excluded juror has the right to bring his own action, as a
practical matter these actions are very rare. Id. at 1372.
179. Id at 1373.
180. See id. (declaring that jurors dismissed because of their race will leave the courtroom
possessing little incentive to begin the arduous task of vindicating their own rights).
181. Id; see id (stating that it is unlikely that jurors would be able to receive declaratory or
injunctive relief because it would be very difficult for jurors to show that discrimination against them
would be likely to recur).
182. Id at 1370-73.
183. See supra notes 138-150 and 157-182 and accompanying text (discussing the Batson and
Powers decisions respectively).
184. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 n.12 (1986) (stating that the Court did not
express an opinion on whether the Constitution imposes any limits upon the exercise of peremptory
challenges by criminal defendants).
185. 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2080 (1991).
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b. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc.: A Civil
Litigant is a State Actor When Exercising
Peremptory Challenges
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the State from denying
any person equal protection of the laws. 186 Both Batson and
Powers involved a peremptory challenge exercised by a prosecutor,
who is clearly a state actor, 8 7 while Edmonson involved a civil
litigant's peremptory challenge.'88 Therefore, in order to find that
the Equal Protection Clause prohibited civil litigants from using
their peremptory challenges to discriminate, the Edmonson Court
had to determine that a civil litigant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges constituted state action.'89
In Edmonson, an African-American construction worker who
was involved in an on-site accident at a federal enclave sued the
Leesville Concrete Company for negligence.' 9° During voir dire,
the defendant used two of its three peremptory challenges to
remove African-Americans from the jury.' 9' The plaintiff, citing
Batson, requested that the defendant articulate race-neutral explan-
ations for striking the jurors.' 92 The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to resolve a split among the courts of appeals over whether
civil litigants are state actors when exercising their peremptory
186. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (declaring that the state cannot deny any person the equal
protection of the laws); see also Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2082 (stating that because the Fourteenth
Amendment only applies to state action, racial discrimination violates the Equal Protection Clause
only when it can be attributed to the state).
187. Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1366 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 83.
188. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080.
189. Id.; see supra note 186 and accompanying text (discussing the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
190. Edmnonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2080. Edmonson sued Leesville Concrete Company in the United
States District Court for the Western District of Louisiana. Id
191. Id at 2081. As impaneled, thejury consisted of 11 white jurors and one African-American
juror. L The jury rendered a verdict for Edmonson, assessing his total damages at $90,000. Id.
However, because the jury attributed 80 percent of the damages to Edmonson's own comparative
negligence, he was awarded only $18,000. Id.
192. Id The District Court denied the request, stating that Batson does not apply in civil
proceedings. Id The plaintiff appealed and a divided panel of the Fifth Circuit reversed the trial
court. Id The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded. Id On rehearing en
banc, the Court of Appeals affirmed. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 860 F.2d 1308 (5th
Cir. 1989) affida 895 F.2d 216 (5th Cir. 1990) (en bane) rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
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challenges and would thus be subject to the race-neutral restriction
of Batson.193
In analyzing whether civil litigants are state actors the majority
used the two-part state action test of Lugar v. Edmonson Oil
Co. 194 Under the Lugar state action test, a private actor's conduct
is considered state action when the private actor exercises a right
created by the state and can fairly be characterized as a state
actor.1 95 The Edmonson Court concluded that the civil litigant's
peremptory challenge clearly met the first prong of the state action
test because the peremptory challenge is a statutory privilege
created by the State.1 96 In analyzing the second prong of the state
action test, the Court evaluated three principles: whether the private
actor relies on government assistance and benefits,197 whether the
private actor is performing a traditional government function, 98
and whether the injury caused to the excluded juror is aggravated
in a unique way by government authority.' 99
First, the Edmonson Court concluded that civil litigants benefit
from the state created jury system."° The Edmonson Court con-
cluded that the government is significantly involved in the exercise
of the civil litigant's peremptory challenge.21 The state estab-
lishes qualifications for jurors, summons them to jury service, and
advises jurors when they have been excused. 2 Furthermore, the
193. Ednonson, 111 5. Ct. at 2081.
194. See id. at 2082 (citing Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922,937 (1982)). The Court
recognized that a state action analysis depends upon the specific facts of each individual case. Id at
2083 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939).
195. Id at 2082-83 (citing Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939-41).
196. Id at 2083; see 28 U.S.C. § 1870 (1966) (granting each litigant in a civil proceeding three
peremptory challenges); supra note 63 (citing the state statutes granting peremptory challenges).
197. Edmnonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083; see Tulsa Professional Collection Serv., Inc. v. Pope, 485
U.S. 478, 487-88 (1988) (finding state action when the probate court was intimately involved with
the decision made by an administrator of a will).
198. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085.
199. Id at 2087; see Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948) (finding state action when the
court enforces a racially discriminatory covenant).
200. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2084.
201. Id; see id (stating that without the overt, significant assistance of the government the
peremptory challenge system could not exist).
202. Id at 2084; see 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1993) (establishing the procedures by which jurors are
selected for service); id §§ 1863(b)(5)-(6) (1993) (outlining the lawful reasons for excusal from jury
service).
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Court asserted that when the trial judge as a state actor enforces a
discriminatory peremptory challenge by excusing the challenged
juror, the state places its authority behind the discrimination.0 3
Next, the Court assessed whether the peremptory challenge as
a jury selection procedure performs a traditional government func-
tion.' The objective of jury selection is to select a jury which
is a government body. 5 Therefore, exercising peremptory chal-
lenges to help choose that government body qualifies as a govern-
ment function.'0 Furthermore, the Edmonson Court declared that
when the government allows civil litigants to assist in the govern-
ment function of choosing a jury, the civil litigants must be subject
to the same equal protection mandates as the state.2°
In its final inquiry under the state action test, the Edmonson
Court analyzed whether the government's involvement in jury
selection aggravated the harm to jurors excluded by a civil liti-
gant's discriminatory peremptory challenge.203 The Court deter-
mined that the courtroom in which peremptory challenges are exer-
cised by a civil litigant intensifies the harmful effects of racial dis-
crimination.' The Court explained that when racial discrimi-
nation occurs within a government building, jurors and the com-
munity are left with serious questions concerning the fairness of the
proceeding and the jury system as a whole.2 0 Furthermore, the
Court asserted that racial discrimination during jury selection
203. See Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085 (stating that the state has created the legal framework
governing the challenged conduct and has therefore significantly involved itself with invidious
discrimination).
204. Uat
205. It; see idt (stating that the jury is a traditional government body having no private
function).
206. It; see id (stating that the jury selection process performs the critical government
functions of guarding the rights of litigants and insuring the continued acceptance of the laws by all
people).
207. Id; see Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461,470 (1953) (holding that a political organization's
primary election is state action). But see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 353
(1974) (holding that a utility company is not a state actor).
208. Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2083.
209. Id; see idt (stating that few places are more expressive of the constitutional authority of
the government than the courtroom).
210. Id.; see id. (declaring that racial bias in the courtroom impugns the integrity of the
proceedings and prevents the ideas of democratic government from becoming a reality).
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offends the dignity of jurors and the integrity of the courts.2 '
Thus, the Edmonson Court concluded that because a civil litigant's
racially discriminatory peremptory challenges qualified as state
action, they violated the equal protection rights of the excluded
jurors." 2
The Edmonson holding continued the erosion of the peremptory
challenge begun by the Court in Swain, Batson, and Powers. 3
After the Supreme Court's decisions in Batson, Powers, and
Edmonson, peremptory challenges exercised by a plaintiff or defen-
dant in a civil proceeding, or a prosecutor in a criminal trial, were
restricted by the Equal Protection Clause.214 However, until the
Georgia v. McCollum 2 5 decision, the Supreme Court had not
addressed the issue of whether the Equal Protection Clause applied
to a criminal defendant's peremptory challenges. 6
II. THE CASE
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Georgia
v. McCollum 217 to decide whether the United States Constitution
prohibits a criminal defendant from engaging in purposeful racial
211. Id.; see id. (stating that to permit racial exclusion in the public forum of the courtroom
compounds the racial insult inherent in judging a person by the color of their skin).
212. Id. Relying on its recent decision in Powers v. Ohio, Il S. CL 1364 (1991), the
Edmonson Court concluded that a civil litigant could assert the rights of the excluded juror. Id. at
2088; see supra note 157-182 and accompanying text (discussing the Powers decision which held
that a criminal defendant had third-party standing to assert the equal protection rights of excluded
jurors).
213. See supra notes 107-130 and accompanying text (examining the initial erosion of the
peremptory challenge in Swain); supra notes 138-150 and accompanying text (analyzing the
continued erosion of the peremptory challenge in Batson); supra notes 157-182 and accompanying
text (discussing the holding of Powers).
214. Batson, 476 U.S. at 84; Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2077; Powers, Ill S. Ct 1370-73.
215. 112 S. CL 2348 (1992).
216. See Batson, 476 U.S. at 89 n.12 (stating that the Court issued no opinion on whether the
Constitution imposes any limit on the exercise of peremptory challenges by defense counsel in a
criminal case). But see id. at 125-26 (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (arguing that the inescapable result of
the Batson decision would be to limit the defense attorney's peremptory challenges).
217. 112 S. Ct. 370 (1992) (granting certiorari).
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discrimination in the exercise of peremptory challenges. 2  In
McCollum, the Supreme Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause prohibits a criminal defendant from using peremptory chal-
lenges to purposefully discriminate on the grounds of race.219
A. Factual and Procedural History
The defendants, Thomas, William and Ella McCollum were
indicted in Dougherty County, Georgia for aggravated assault and
simple battery.m The charges alleged that the McCollums, who
are white, assaulted Jerry and Myra Collins, an African-American
couple, at the McCollums' drycleaning business in Albany,
Georgia.22' In response to the alleged assaults, a leaflet was cir-
culated in the local African-American community reporting the
assaults and urging community residents not to patronize the
McCollums' dry cleaning store. 2  This boycott of the defendants'
store led to heightened racial tensions within the communit,' which
continued throughout the trial.22
Before jury selection began, the prosecutor, relying on the rea-
soning of Batson, moved to prohibit the defendants from exercising
their peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory man-
ner.2'4 The prosecutor claimed that the defense counsel planned
to exclude all African-Americans from the jury in order to achieve
218. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2351 (1992). Prior to the McCollum decision, many state
courts, acting pursuant to their state constitutions, had prohibited criminal defendants from using
peremptory challenges to racially discriminate against jurors. People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal. 3d 258, 583
P.2d 748, 148 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1978). The Ninth Circuit recently prohibited criminal defendants from
exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of gender, State v. Alvarado, 534 A.2d 440 (NJ.
1987); State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984); State v. Levinson, 795 P.2d 845 (Raw. 1990);
Commonwealth v. Soares, 387 N.E.2d 499, cert. denied, 444 U.S. 881 (1979); People v. Kern, 545
N.Y.S.2d 4 (1989); United States v. De Gross, 960 F.2d 1433 (9th Cir. 1992) (en bane). The United
States Supreme Court recently granted certiorari in a case to decide whether the Equal Protection
Clause. prohibits gender-based peremptory challenges. J.E.B. v. State of Alabama ex rel. T.B., 606
So. 2d 156 (Ala. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3771 (U.S. May 17, 1993) (No. 92-1239).
219. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359.
220. IL at 2351.
221. Ia
222. Ia
223. Ia
224. Id; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986).
1918
1993 / Georgia v. McCollum
an all white jury.' The prosecutor explained that forty-three per-
cent of Dougherty County's population was African-American and
therefore, if a statistically representative jury panel were assembled,
only eighteen of the forty-two potential jurors22 6  would be
African-Americans. 227 Based on these numbers, the prosecutor
argued that because both the prosecution and defense each receive
twenty peremptory challenges, it would be possible for the defen-
dants to remove all African-Americans from the selected jury.22'
Therefore, the prosecutor sought an order under Batson providing
that if the prosecutor made out a prima facie case of racial dis-
crimination, the defendants would be required to articulate race-
neutral explanations for their peremptory challenges.2
The trial court, finding that neither Georgia law nor federal law
prohibited criminal defendants from exercising their peremptory
challenges in a racially discriminatory manner, denied the pro-
secutor's motion and the issue was certified for immediate
appeal.2 The Supreme Court of Georgia, by a four to three vote,
affirmed the trial court's ruling.2 1 The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari to decide the question left open by its pre-
vious decisions in Batson and Edmonson: whether the Constitution
prohibits a criminal defendant from using race-based peremptory
challenges. 2
225. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2351.
226. Il at 2352 n.l. Under Georgia law, the jury in a felony trial is selected from a venire of
42 persons. GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-160 (1990).
227. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2351.
228. IL Under Georgia law, a defendant who is charged with an offense carrying a penalty of
four or more years is granted 20 peremptory challenges. Id.; GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-165 (1992).
229. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2351-52; see supra notes 147-150 and accompanying text
(discussing acceptable race-neutral explanations under Batson).
230. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2352.
231. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d 688 (Ga.), cert. granted, 112 S. Ct. 370 (1991), rev'd, 112
S. CL 2348 (1992). Citing the long history of jury trials in protecting human rights, a majority of the
Georgia Supreme Court refused to extend the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Batson and
Edmonson which held that the prosecution and civil litigants could not use their peremptory
challenges to racially discriminate against jurors, to include criminal defendants. State v. McCollum,
405 S.E.2d at 688. Three justices dissented, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in Edmonson
must logically apply to criminal defendants as well. State v. McCollum, 405 S.E.2d at 689-93 (Hunt,
J., Fletcher, J. and Benham, J., dissenting).
232. Id.
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B. The Majority Opinion
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by
Justice Blackmun, "3 addressed whether the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution prohibits criminal defen-
dants from using their peremptory challenges in a racially discrim-
inatory manner.' In order to decide this issue, the Supreme
Court separated its opinion into four questions: first, whether a
criminal defendant's exercise of racially discriminatory peremptory
challenges harm the excluded juror, the community, and the judi-
cial system;235 second, whether the exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges by a criminal defendant constitutes state action;236 third,
whether the prosecution has standing to assert the equal protection
rights of excluded jurors; 7 and fourth, whether the constitutional
rights of criminal defendants are outweighed by the harm done by
discriminatory peremptory challenges.2 8
233. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2351 (7-2 decision). Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White,
Justice Stevens, Justice Kennedy, and Justice Souter joined the opinion of the Court written by
Justice Blackmun. lad at 2350. Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas each filed a separate concurring
opinion. Id at 2359 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring); id (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor and
Justice Scalia each filed separate dissenting opinions. Id at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); id at
2364 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Although the votes of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas are
counted on the side of the majority, both joined the Court's opinion reluctantly and only because they
felt McCollum was the logical extension of Edmonson. Id. at 2359 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring); id.
(Thomas, J., concurring).
234. IL at 2359; see id (stating that peremptory challenges may not be based on either the race
of the juror or the racial stereotype held by the challenger).
235. Id at 2353-54; see infra notes 239-247 and accompanying text (concluding that the same
harms result when a criminal defendant uses peremptory challenges to racially discriminate as result
from the prosecution's discriminatory use).
236. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2354-57; see infra notes 249-275 and accompanying text
(discussing the Court's conclusion that criminal defendants are state actors when exercising their
peremptory challenges to racially discriminate).
237. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357; see infra notes 277-286 and accompanying text (concluding
that the prosecution has third-party standing to assert the equal protection rights of the excluded
jurors).
238. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2357-59; see infra notes 287-294 and accompanying text
(determining that the constitutional rights guaranteed to the criminal defendant outweigh the
discrimination done to the excluded juror).
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1. The Harms taused by Racially Discriminatory Per-
emptory Challenges
The Court began its opinion by explaining that its decisions in
Batson, Powers and Edmonson were designed to serve multiple
ends.23 While these decisions were intended to protect the crim-
inal defendant from discriminatory jury selection, they were also
designed to remedy the harms to the individual jurors and the com-
munity resulting from discriminatory peremptory challenges.'4
Thus, the question facing the Court was whether the same harms
resulted when criminal defendants used peremptory challenges to
racially discriminate as when discriminatory peremptory challenges
were exercised by prosecutors and civil litigants.241
First, the McCollum Court concluded that whether initiated by
a prosecutor, a civil litigant, or a criminal defendant, racially dis-
criminatory peremptory challenges harm the excluded jurors by
subjecting them to open and public discrimination.242 The Court
explained that while jurors do not have the right to sit on a partic-
ular jury, they do have the right not to be excluded from a jury
based solely on their race.243
Next, the Court found that no matter who exercises the discrim-
inatory peremptory challenge, discrimination impugns the fairness
of jury verdicts and undermines the public's confidence in our jus-
tice system.2' The Court asserted that the public's confidence in
the integrity of the justice system is essential for preserving com-
munity peace in trials involving race-related crimes.245 The Court
explained that public confidence in jury verdicts in trials involving
239. McCollum, 112 S.Ct. at 2353.
240. Id (stating that the extension of Batson to civil litigants was designed to remedy the harm
done to the dignity of the jurors and the integrity of the courts).
241. Id ; see Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2082 (1991) (stating
that racial discrimination harms the excluded juror no less in the civil proceeding than in a criminal
trial); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1368 (1991) (stating that Batson was designed to serve the
multiple ends of remedying harms to the excluded juror and the community).
242. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353.
243. Id
244. l d at 2353-54 (citing Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1371).
245. Id. at 2354.
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race-related crimes is extremely important because reaction of the
affected community to the verdicts will inevitably be heated and
volatile.246 Thus, the Court concluded that the harms resulting
from a criminal defendant's discriminatory peremptory challenge
undermine the confidence in the fairness of jury verdicts and the
justice system as a whole.247 However, in order for the Court to
remedy this harm under the Equal Protection Clause, the criminal
defendant's exercise of peremptory challenges must qualify as state
248action.
2. Is a Criminal Defendant A State Actor?
The second question the Court addressed in determining
whether the Equal Protection Clause prohibits criminal defendants
from using peremptory challenges in a racially discriminatory man-
ner was whether the criminal defendant's use of peremptory chal-
lenges constituted state action.249 The Court needed to resolve
this question because the Fourteenth Amendment only prohibits the
state from violating the Equal Protection Clause.25 The Court
analyzed the criminal defendant's use of peremptory challenges
under the state action test delineated in Lugar v. Edmonson Oil
Co.25' The Court noted that under the two-part state action test,
it must assess whether the constitutional violation resulted from a
right created by the state and whether the private party charged
with the violation can fairly be described as a state actor.25 2 The
majority concluded that the first part of the test was met because
the peremptory challenge is a statutory right that is not constit-
246. Id.; see supra note 223 and accompanying text (stating that the McCollum trial involved
heightened racial tensions).
247. McCollum, 112 S. Ct., at 2354.
248. Id
249. Id
250. Id.; see id (stating that racial discrimination violates the Constitution only when it is
attributable to the state).
251. Id.; see supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text (discussing the Lugar state action
test).
252. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2354-55.
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utionally guaranteed. z 3 In analyzing the second part of the state
action test, whether the defendant can be fairly characterized as a
state actor, the Court looked to the same three principles evaluated
in Edmonson: the extent to which the private actor relied on
government benefits and assistance; whether the private action is
a traditional government function; and whether the injury caused
by the constitutional violation is aggravated by government
involvement.2
In analyzing whether the criminal defendant relies on govern-
ment benefits and assistance, the McCollum Court asserted that the
jury system could not exist without the assistance of the govern-
ment. 5 The Court explained that the state compiles jury lists,
summons jurors to jury service, pays jurors for their service,
administers the jury's oath, and ultimately excuses the juror when
a litigant exercises a peremptory challenge. 6 Thus, the Court
concluded that when a private actor exercises a peremptory chal-
lenge during jury selection, that actor is relying on significant
government assistance and benefits. 5 7
Next, the Court analyzed whether exercising peremptory chal-
lenges is a traditional government function. 8 The Court con-
cluded that the peremptory challenge fulfills a traditional govern-
ment function because its sole purpose is to assist the government
in the selection of an impartial jury. 9 The Court explained that
the jury system performs the critical government functions of pro-
tecting the rights of the accused against government oppression and
promoting acceptance of the laws within the community.2'
Further, the Court asserted that the state is under a constitutional
253. Id at 2355.
254. Id (citing Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077, 2083 (1991)).
255. Id
256. ld; see GA. CODE ANN. § 15-12-40 (1990) (stating that jury fists should be comprised of
intelligent and upright citizens representing a fair cross-section of the county); id § 15-12-120 (1990)
(providing that the judge of the superior court shall draw the names of and summon the persons
chosen to serve as trial jurors); id § 15-12-132 (1990) (requiring each jury panel to take the oath set
forth by this statute); id § 15-12-163 (1990) (authorizing the court to excuse jurors for cause).
257. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355.
258. Id
259. Id. (citing Edmonson, 111 5. Ct. at 2083).
260. Id. at 2355 (citing Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2085).
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duty to provide an impartial jury,26' and that the trial courts can-
not avoid their constitutional responsibilities by delegating the
public function of jury selection to private parties.262 Thus, the
Court determined that the private action of criminal defendants
exercising their peremptory challenges was a traditional govern-
ment function.263
The third issue the majority addressed in its state action analy-
sis was whether the injury resulting from the criminal defendant's
discriminatory peremptory challenges was aggravated by govern-
mental authority.264 The majority asserted that regardless of who
exercises the discriminatory peremptory challenge, the perception
will be that the court has excused jurors because of their race, and
that discrimination will be attributed to the state.265 The majority
asserted that the courtroom setting of peremptory challenges aggra-
vates the harm to the juror because, when the state excuses the
juror for a peremptory challenge based on race, it appears as if the
state is sanctioning racial discrimination. 266 Thus, the Court con-
cluded that a criminal defendant's exercise of peremptory chal-
lenges met the three-part state action test and is therefore restricted
by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 267
After concluding that a criminal defendant's exercise of per-
emptory challenges constitutes state action, the Court distinguished
McCollum from the Court's contrary 1981 decision in Polk County
v. Dodson.268 In Dodson, a criminal defendant sued a public
261. Id at 2355-56; see supra note 25 (discussing the Sixth Amendment right to an impartial
jury).
262. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355-56; cf. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42,57 (1988) (holding that
a private physician hired to provide medical services at a state prison was a state actor because he
was fulfilling a duty otherwise belonging to the state); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 477 (1953)
(holding that a private political party's determination of qualifications for primary voters was state
action).
263. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2356.
264. Id at 2355.
265. l at 2356; see Barbara A. Underwood, Ending Race Discrimination in Jury Selection:
Whose Right is it Anyway?, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 725, 751 n.117 (1992) (arguing that it is common
practice not to reveal the identity of the challenging party to the jurors, enhancing the perception that
it is the court that has rejected the jurors).
266. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
267. IL at 2355-56.
268. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
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defender under a federal statute applicable only to state actors. 269
The defendant claimed that the public defender had violated his
constitutional rights in failing to provide adequate represen-
tation.70 The Supreme Court held that a public defender cannot
violate a defendant's constitutional rights because public defenders
do not qualify as state actors when engaged in the general repre-
sentation of their clients.27 The McCollum Court distinguished
Dodson by limiting the Dodson holding to mean that the attorney's
public employment alone was not sufficient to qualify the attorney
as a state actor.272 In differentiating Dodson from the Court's
holding in McCollum, the McCollum Court stated that unlike the
representative role of the public defender in question in the Dodson
case, criminal defendants use their peremptory challenges to choose
an essential governmental body.273 After determining that the
factual situations in Dodson and McCollum were distinguishable,
the McCollum Court concluded that whether an attorney is a state
actor depends on the nature and context of the function the attorney
is performing.274 Thus, the McCollum Court reiterated its holding
that racially discriminatory peremptory challenges exercised by the
criminal defendant are state action and therefore in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause.275 However, in order for the prosecution
to challenge the equal protection violation resulting to jurors from
269. Id at 314 (1981); see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981) (providing that every person who, under
color of state law, subjects any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights
secured by the Constitution and laws shall be liable to that deprived person for redress).
270. Dodson, 454 U.S. at 314.
271. Id. at 319. Although the Dodson Court actually determined whether the public defender's
actions were under color of state law, as opposed to whether or not they constituted state action, the
Supreme Court has subsequently held that the two inquiries are the same. See, e.g., Rendell-Baker
v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 838 (1982) (stating that the color of state law required under 28 U.S.C. §
1983 has consistently been treated the same as the state action requirement under the Fourteenth
Amendment). Furthermore, the Supreme Court has specifically extended its reasoning in Dodson to
state action cases. Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1009 n. 20 (1982).
272. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (1992). But see id at 2362 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the clear holding of Dodson is that defending an accused is a private function
and not state action).
273. Id., 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
274. Id; see Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980) (holding that a public defender is a state
actor when making personnel decisions on behalf of the state).
275. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2356.
1925
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 24
the criminal defendant's race-based peremptory challenge, the
Court needed to determine whether the prosecution qualified for
third party standing to assert the rights of the excluded jurors.276
3. The Prosecution's Third-Party Standing to Assert the
Rights of Jurors Excluded By Discriminatory Per-
emptory Challenges
The McCollum Court began its analysis by stating that, ordi-
narily, persons are only allowed to assert their own legal rights and
may not rest a claim for relief on an injury to a third party.277
However, the Supreme Court recognized that it does allow litigants
to bring actions on behalf of third parties if: the litigant has suf-
fered a concrete, redressable injury, the litigant has a close relation
to the injured party, and there exists some hinderance to the third
party's protecting its own interests.278 Applying the third-party
standing test, the McCollum Court concluded that the prosecution
qualified for third party standing and could bring an equal pro-
tection challenge against the criminal defendant.279
In analyzing the first prong of the third-party standing test, the
Court determined that the prosecution is harmed by racially
discriminatory peremptory challenges.28 The Court explained that
racial discrimination by the criminal defendant during the jury
selection process places the fairness of the judicial system in doubt
and impugns the integrity of the criminal trial.21 Next, in anal-
yzing the second prong of the third-party standing test, the Court
concluded that the prosecution has a close relation to the excluded
juror. Voir dire establishes a bond of trust between the pro-
secution and the jurors and this trusting relationship is severed
276. Id at 2357.
277. l; Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364, 1370 (1991); see supra note 164-166 and
accompanying text (stating that third-party standing is required in order for the defendant to assert
the rights of excluded jurors).
278. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2357.
279. Id
280. Id.
281. Id. (citing Powers, 111 S. Ct. at 1371).
282. Id
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when a juror is excluded based on race.283 Therefore, the Court
reasoned that the prosecution, as the representative of the state, is
the logical and proper party to assert the equal protection rights of
excluded jurors.284 Finally, under the third prong of the standing
test, the Court concluded that jurors excluded by discriminatory
peremptory challenges are unlikely to be able to vindicate their
own rights because of the practical and financial barriers of liti-
gation.285 Thus, because the McCollum Court determined that the
prosecution fulfilled all three requirements under the third-party
standing test, the Court concluded that the prosecution has standing
to bring the equal protection claims of jurors excluded by the crim-
inal defendant's discriminatory peremptory challenge.286 The final
issue confronting the Court was whether the harms to the juror and
the community resulting from discriminatory peremptory challenges
outweighed the criminal defendant's constitutional rights.
4. The Criminal Defendant's Constitutional Rights
Weighed Against the Harms Resulting from Discri-
mination
The final issue the Court addressed was whether the rights of
the criminal defendant are outweighed by the harms to the
excluded jurors and the community resulting from discriminatory
peremptory challenges.287 The Court began by explaining that the
use of peremptory challenges is not a constitutionally guaranteed
283. Id. (citing Powers, 11I S. Ct. at 1372).
284. Id.
285. Id ; see Dunnigan, supra note 106, at 367 (stating that jurors have no opportunity to be
heard at the time of their exclusion and that due to the economic burdens of litigation, jurors are
deterred by the relatively small financial stake in bringing their own action). The third-party standing
analysis used in McCollum to determine whether the prosecution could assert the rights of jurors
excluded by the criminal defendant's racially discriminatory peremptory challenges was based
exclusively on the Court's reasoning in Powers. McCollum, 112 S. C. at 2357; see supra notes 167-
182 and accompanying text (outlining the third-party standing analysis used by the Powers Court to
determine that the prosecution could assert the rights of a juror excluded by a criminal defendant's
racially discriminatory peremptory challenge).
286. McCollum, 112 S. C. at 2357.
287. Id at 2357-58.
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right.288 Peremptory challenges are only a device created by the
state to help achieve the Sixth Amendment right to an impartialjury.289 Prohibiting a criminal defendant from using discrimi-
natory peremptory challenges altogether would not violate the
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.290
Furthermore, the Court asserted that prohibiting peremptory chal-
lenges would not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
effective counsel.29' The McCollum Court explained that it would
be possible for defense attorneys to come forward with race-neutral
explanations for their peremptory challenges without revealing con-
fidential communication or compromising trial strategy.292 Thus,
the Court concluded that while the defendant has a right to a jury
free from racial bias, this right only extends to removing jurors
who harbor racial prejudice and not to discriminating against jurors
on account of their race.293 The Court declared that the
Constitution will not permit racial discrimination to be the price
that is paid for the acceptance of jury verdicts as fair and
impartial.29 4
In conclusion, the McCollum Court held that the exercise of
discriminatory peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant con-
stitutes state action and, as a result, violates the equal protection
rights of excluded jurors.295 The Court determined that discrim-
ination within the criminal justice system damages the integrity of
the criminal courts by bringing the fairness of its proceedings into
doubt.296 Furthermore, the Court concluded that the harms to the
jurors and the community resulting from racial discrimination out-
weighed the criminal defendant's right to unrestricted peremptory
288. Id at 2358.
289. See idt (asserting that the peremptory challenge can be withheld altogether without
violating a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair and impartial jury).
290. Id
291. Id
292. Id
293. Id. at 2359.
294. Id at 2358 (stating that it is an affront to justice to argue that a fair trial demands the right
to racially discriminate).
295. Id. at 2354-57.
296. Id. at 2357.
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challenges.297 Finally, the McCollum Court reaffirmed the rule
enunciated in Batson that peremptory challenges may not be exer-
cised on the basis of a juror's race or on racial stereotypes held by
the challenger.298
C. Concurring Opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist
Chief Justice Rehnquist filed a brief concurring opinion reaf-
firming his belief that Edmonson was incorrectly decided."' In
Edmonson, Chief Justice Rehnquist joined Justice O'Connor's dis-
sent which argued that a peremptory challenge by a civil litigant is
a matter of private choice and not state action, and therefore, could
not violate the equal protection rights of excluded jurors.300 In
McCollum, Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred with the majority but
did so only because he felt that Edmonson controlled the outcome
of McCollum.301
D. Concurring Opinion of Justice Thomas
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he, like
Chief Justice Rehnquist, only joined the opinion of the majority
because he believed Edmonson was controlling precedent.?°
Justice Thomas wrote separately to express his dissatisfaction with
the Court's continued erosion of the peremptory challenge. 03 He
declared that the unrestricted use of peremptory challenges is essen-
297. Id. at 2358.
298. Id. at 2359. The case was remanded to the Georgia trial court, giving the prosecution the
opportunity to demonstrate a prima facie case of purposeful racial discrimination under the Batson
testl I& If the prosecution establishes a prima facie case of discrimination, the defendants will be
required to articulate racially-neutral reasons for their peremptory challenges. Id.; see supra notes
143-150 and accompanying text (discussing the prima facie case and burden of proof under Batson).
299. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 (Rehnquist, CJ., concurring).
300. Ua; Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2077,2089 (1991) (O'Connor,
J., dissenting).
301. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2359 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
302. See id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that because Edmonson is recent precedent, the
Court must accept the consequences of Edmonson's holding). Justice Thomas stated that absent
Ednonson he would have voted with the dissent in this case. Id.
303. Id
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tial for a minority criminal defendant to achieve racial represen-
tation on the jury."°4
Justice Thomas argued that the majority departed from the ori-
ginal reasoning of Strauder v. West Virginia,0 5 which recognized
the right of criminal defendants not to be tried by a jury from
which members of their race had been purposefully excluded.3 6
He explained that the Strauder decision recognized that the racial
composition of a jury may affect the outcome of the trial.307
Therefore, racial representation on the jury may help the minority
defendant overcome racial bias and improve the defendant's chance
of receiving a fair trial.30 8 However, Justice Thomas asserted that
McCollum's restrictions on the peremptory challenge will frustrate
the minority defendant's attempts to achieve a racially represen-
tative jury.
Furthermore, Justice Thomas argued that this departure from
Strauder will have several unfavorable consequences, particularly
for minority defendants.3° Justice Thomas asserted that the first
unfavorable consequence of the McCollum decision will be the
emergence of more biased juries.31 0 After McCollum, minority
defendants will be unable to secure representation of their minority
group on the jury by removing members of the majority with per-
emptory challenges. n The second negative consequence is that
the Court has exalted the equal protection rights of jurors over the
right of the criminal defendant to have a fair and impartial
jury.312 Justice Thomas believed this to be in error because it is
the criminal defendant and not the juror who faces imprisonment
304. It
305. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879); see supra note 113 (discussing the
Strauder decision).
306. McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2359 (Thomas, J., concurring).
307. Id. at 2360.
308. Id.
309. id. at 2359 (stating that this departure will lead to unfavorable consequences, particularly
for the African-American criminal defendant).
310. Id. at 2360.
311. Id
312. Id
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or even death, depending on the jury's decision. 3  Justice
Thomas expressed concern that, under the majority's decision, even
if the defendant believes a juror to be racist, unless a juror actually
admits racial prejudice during voir dire, the defendant will be
unable to remove the juror and instead will suffer the consequences
of a biased jury.314
E. Dissenting Opinion of Justice O'Connor
Justice O'Connor wrote separately because she disagreed with
315the majority's state action analysis. The second prong of the
state action test requires that a private actor be fairly characterized
as a state actor.316 Justice O'Connor believed that the majority's
analysis of this prong lacked a realistic assessment of the adver-
sarial relationship between the defendant and the government in a
criminal proceeding.317 She asserted that the result of the adver-
sarial relationship on the state action analysis was made clear in
Polk County v. Dodson.318 In Dodson, the Supreme Court held
that a public defender is not a state actor when performing tradi-
tional functions of an attorney for a defendant.319 Similar to the
situation in Dodson, Justice O'Connor stated that the obligations of
defense counsel in McCollum were to act in the best interests of
the client.320 She explained that this is achieved, not by acting in
313. Id. (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to the McCollum decision as a misordering of
priorities).
314. Il
315. Il at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see supra notes 249-275 and accompanying text
(discussing the majority's state action analysis in McCollum).
316. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The majority analyzed three
questions in addressing the second prong of the Lugar state action test. Ia at 2355. First, the majority
determined the extent to which the actor receives governmental assistance. ld. Second, the majority
decided whether the private party was performing a traditional government function. IaL Finally, the
majority analyzed whether the injury caused was aggravated in a unique way by government
authority. Id.
317. IL at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
318. 454 U.S. 312 (1981).
319. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., concurring); see supra notes 268-274 and
accompanying text (discussing the Dodson case).
320. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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conjunction with the State, but by opposing the interests advanced
by the State.321
Justice O'Connor further argued that the independence of
defense counsel from state control has constitutional dimen-
322sions. Implicit in the constitutional right to an attorney is the
assumption that the attorney will be free from state control.32a
Thus, due to the adversarial nature of the criminal trial, Justice
O'Connor concluded that the criminal defendant's use of per-
emptory challenges could not be attributed to the state and that,
therefore, the criminal defendant was not a state actor.324
Next, Justice O'Connor distinguished McCollum from the
Supreme Court's holding in Edmonson, which held that civil liti-
gants were state actors.32 She argued that the adversarial rela-
tionship between the State and the defendant that exists in a crim-
inal trial was not present in the civil proceeding in Edmonson.326
In civil litigation, two private parties are in opposition, but in a
criminal trial the defendant is in direct opposition to the state.327
Therefore, Justice O'Connor concluded that the adversarial relation-
ship between the defendant and the prosecution in a criminal trial
precluded the majority's finding that a criminal defendant is a state
actor.
328
Finally, Justice O'Connor addressed the argument she found to
be implicit in the majority's reasoning: that allowing criminal
defendants to use discriminatory peremptory challenges will shift
the balance in jury selection in the defendant's favor.329 Dis-
agreeing with this argument, Justice O'Connor maintained that
321. Id.
322. Id; see U.S. CONST. amend VI (granting the criminal defendant the right to counsel in
federal criminal trials); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (establishing the defendant's right
to independent counsel in state proceedings under the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause).
323. See McCollum, 112S. Ct. at 2362 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that a fair trial cannot
exist without effective and independent counsel).
324. Id at 2361 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
325. Id
326. Id at 2363 (O'Connor, 3., dissenting).
327. Id
328. Id.
329. Id at 2363-64 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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many aspects of a criminal trial are intended to favor the defen-
dant.33 She asserted that the concept that only the government
can violate a person's constitutional rights under the Equal
Protection Clause is a fundamental tenet of our legal order, not an
obstacle to be overcome by extending state action status to private
actors.331 in conclusion, Justice O'Connor asserted that the major-
ity's holding will harm minority defendants because unrestricted
peremptory challenges are necessary for a minority defendant to
secure minority representation on the jury and lessen the possibility
of racial bias.332
E Dissenting Opinion of Justice Scalia
Although Justice Scalia agreed with the majority, Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, that the McCollum decision is the
next logical step after Edmonson, he dissented because he believed
that Edmonson was incorrectly decided.333 Justice Scalia stated
that he agreed with Justice O'Connor's conclusion that criminal
defendants are not state actors but wrote separately from Justice
O'Connor because he felt that Edmonson was indistinguishable
from McCollum.3" He stated, without further expanation, that the
majority's decision, in the attempt to further racial harmony, has
destroyed the criminal defendant's right to secure a fair jury.335
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The majority in Georgia v. McCollum held that criminal defen-
dants must provide race-neutral explanations for their peremptory
challenges after the prosecution has raised a prima facie case of
330. Id. at 2364.
331. Id
332. Id
333. See id (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the McCollum decision reduces Edmonson to
the terminally absurd because a criminal defendant in the course of defending himself against the
state cannot be at the same time acting on behalf of the state).
334. See id at 2365 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
335. Id
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purposeful discrimination.336 The McCollum decision completed
the Supreme Court's erosion of the peremptory challenge begun
twenty-seven years ago in Swain v. Alabama.37 The Swain Court,
despite the ancient roots of unrestricted peremptory challenges, held
that prosecutors could not use their peremptory challenges to sys-
tematically exclude jurors in case after case based solely on their
race. 338 In Batson v. Kentucky,339 this concept was supple-
mented with a new evidentiary burden which allowed criminal
defendants to raise a prima facie case based on the peremptory
challenges exercised by the prosecution during their particular
trial.' Under Batson, once a criminal defendant has raised a
prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, the prosecution is
required to provide a race-neutral reason for using a peremptory
challenge to remove the excluded juror. 1 If the prosecution can-
not come forward with an acceptable explanation then the chal-
lenged juror will remain on the jury. 2 In Edmonson v. Leesville
Concrete Co. Inc.,343 the Court furthered the impact of this ero-
sion on the unrestricted use of peremptory challenges by requiring
civil litigants to provide race-neutral explanations for their per-
emptory challenges as well.344
Now, after the McCollum decision, all litigants in both civil and
criminal trials are required to provide race-neutral explanations for
their peremptory challenges once their opponent has raised a prima
336. Id at 2359; see supra notes 143-147 and accompanying text (discussing the requirements
for a prima facie case under Batson).
337. 380 U.S. 202 (1965); see supra notes 107-130 and accompanying text (reviewing the
Court's decision in Swain).
338. Swain, 380 U.S. at 224 (1965).
339. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
340. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (1986); see supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text
(explaining the Batson test).
341. Batson, 476 U.S. at 97.
342. Id
343. 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991).
344. Id. at 2089; see supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text (outlining the reasoning of
the Court's holding in Ednonson).
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facie case of purposeful discrimination. 45 Although the extension
of Batson to criminal defendants has been characterized by some
as inevitable,6 there are significant practical and constitutional
differences in the treatment of criminal defendants as opposed to
the prosecutor and civil litigants which affect the state action deter-
mination.' The majority in McCollum failed to consider these
differences in its state action analysis.
A. A Criminal Defendant Cannot in all Fairness be Deemed a
State Actor
The question of whether a criminal defendant's peremptory
challenges are constrained by the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment depends upon whether the criminal defen-
dant can "fairly be deemed a state actor."348 Using the same state
action analysis applied to civil litigants in Edmonson, the
McCollum Court held that a criminal defendant was a state
actor.349 However, in reaching its conclusion, the majority failed
to consider the unique adversarial relatidnship between the prose-
cution and the defense which did not exist in the civil proceeding
in Edmonson.350 Furthermore, the McCollum majority failed to
345. See Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2359 (1992) (requiring criminal defendants
to provide race-neutral explanations for their peremptory challenges); Edmonson, 111 S. Ct. at 2089
(holding that civil litigants must provide race-neutral explanations); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79, 97 (1986) (declaring that the prosecution must provide race-neutral explanations). Recently, the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the Equal Protection Clause
prohibits gender-based peremptory challenges. J.E.B. v. State of Alabama ex rel. T.B., 606 So. 2d
156 (Ala. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3771 (U.S. May 17, 1993) (No. 92-1239).
346. See Edmonson, 11 S. Ct. at 2095 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that the extension of
requiring civil litigants to provide explanations for their peremptory challenges must also logically
apply to criminal defendants).
347. See infra notes 352-365 and accompanying text (describing the practical and legal
differences between civil litigants and criminal defendants).
348. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2355.
349. lId at 2356; see supra notes 194-212 and accompanying text (outlining the state action
analysis used in Edmonson).
350. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2363 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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evaluate whether the constitutional protections granted to the
accused affect the state action determination.3
51
1. The Adversarial Nature of a Criminal Trial Precludes
a Finding that a Criminal Defendant is a State Actor
The McCollum Court determined that it was fair to consider a
criminal defendant exercising a peremptory challenge as a state
actor.35 1 The majority concluded that the same criteria which
qualified civil litigants as state actors in Edmonson also existed
when criminal defendants exercised peremptory challenges in
McCollum. 35 3 However, the McCollum Court's analysis failed to
evaluate the practical and constitutional differences between civil
litigants and criminal defendants during trial.354
When extending the Batson test to include civil litigants, the
Edmonson Court limited its holding to the ordinary civil context
where the state was not a party.355 This limitation of the
Edmonson holding recognizes the unique position which develops
when the state enters the litigation.3 6 In contrast to civil litigants
who each share the same relationship to the state during liti-
gation,5 7 the criminal defendant is engaged in a battle against the
state.3 1 Thus, it is the existence of the State as prosecutor in the
criminal trial which disrupts the symmetry between the litigants
351. However, the majority did weigh the jurors' equal protection rights against the criminal
defendant's rights later in the opinion. Id. at 2358.
352. lit at 2357.
353. Id at 2354-57; see supra notes 194-199 and accompanying text (outlining the criteria
required for finding that an individual is a state actor).
354. Id. at 2361.
355. See Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., Inc., I11 S. Ct. 2077, 2086 (1991) (stating that
when the government is not a party, an adversarial relationship does not exist between the
government and the civil litigants).
356. See id. (stating that in the civil context, the government and the civil litigants work
towards the same end).
357. Id.
358. See Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 8, Georgia v.
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992) (No. 91-372) (arguing that the adversary nature of a criminal trial
precludes finding that a criminal defendant is a state actor when exercising peremptory challenges).
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and the state that was crucial to the Court's decision in
Edmonson.3 9
The Edmonson Court emphasized the important impact of the
adversarial relationship between the state and the criminal defen-
dant in the criminal trial by rejecting the holding of Polk County
v. Dodson. 3 1 In Dodson, the Court held that public defenders
could not fairly be called state actors because of their adversarial
relationship with the state.361 The Edmonson Court distinguished
civil litigants from public defenders by asserting that an adversarial
relationship does not exist in a civil proceeding.362 While this is
true in the civil context, the McCollum majority mistakenly applied
the same reasoning to the criminal trial where an adversarial
relationship does exist.363 The McCollum majority distinguished
Dodson by stating that unlike the public defender's representative
role in defending a client, a criminal defendant uses peremptory
challenges to chose a government body-the jury.36 While it is
true that the result of the jury selection process is to choose a
government body, the majority's narrow characterization of the pur-
pose of jury selection fails to consider the criminal defendant's
uniquely personal stake in the selection of impartial fact-
finders.365
The decision to remove a particular juror is a tactical decision
made in the process of defending one's client.3  In most
instances, an attorney will challenge jurors because of an intuitive
359. Id.; see Goldwasser, supra note 106, at 821 (stating that asymmetry between the defendant
and the prosecution in a criminal trial is rooted in the constitutional protections granted to the
accused).
360. Edmonson, Ill S. Ct. at 2086 (citing Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981)).
361. Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981).
362. Edmonson, 111 S. CL at 2086.
363. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2356 (1992).
364. Id.
365. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 12-13, McCollum (No.
91-372); see Goldwasser, supra note 106, at 829 (stating that for the defendant everything about the
criminal trial is intensely personal).
366. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 12-13, McCollum (No.
91-372); see Respondent's Brief at 8, Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. CL 2348 (1992) (No. 91-372)
(asserting that a criminal defendant's exercise of a peremptory challenge is always a strategic decision
made solely by the accused and the attorney based upon the facts and circumstances of the case).
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sense that the prospective jurors will not be fair.3 67 The attorney's
objective in using peremptory challenges to remove jurors is not to
impanel a government body but to prevent trial by jurors who are
biased against the defendant.368 Therefore, the McCollum Court's
state action analysis lacked a realistic analysis of the criminal
defendant as a state actor because it ignored the unique adversarial
nature of the criminal trial.369  Furthermore, the relationship
between the prosecution and the defendant in a criminal trial is not
the same by constitutional definition because the possession which
the defendant stands to lose is liberty and possibly even life.370
2. The Constitutional Protections Granted to the Criminal
Defendant Preclude a Finding of State Action
The majority's decision in McCollum relied on the theory that
in a criminal prosecution between the accused and the state, "the
scales are to be evenly held., 37 1 However, in reality, the pro-
secution and the defense are not treated alike.372 This asymmetry
between the prosecution and the defense is rooted in the
Constitution which grants the criminal defendant a number of trial
related rights.373 The criminal defendant enjoys the right to be
367. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 12-13, McCollum (No.
91-372).
368. See Respondent's Brief at 11, McCollum (No. 91-372) (stating that in a criminal trial the
defendant is in combat against the state during jury selection); see also 4 WI.LLIAM BLACKsTONr,
COMMEaNARMS 353 (15th ed. 1809) (declaring that under the law a defendant should not be tried
by any juror whom the defendant believes is prejudiced, even if the defendant cannot assign a reason
for this belief).
369. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 8, McCollum (No. 91-
372).
370. See Georgia v. MeCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(asserting that it is the criminal defendant who faces imprisonment and possibly even death in a
criminal trial); Respondent's Brief at 14, McCollum (No. 91-372) (declaring that a criminal trial is
the most important battle of the defendant's life because it is a struggle to preserve liberty and
possibly even life).
371. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2353 n.4 (quoting Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U.S. 68. 70 (1887)).
372. See Goldwasser, supra note 106, at 821 (arguing that fairness does not require that the
prosecution and the defendant be granted the exact same rights).
373. Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 17, McCollum (No. 91-
372); see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 155 (1968) (stating that the Framers granted the
criminal defendant the right to trial by jury in order to prevent oppression by the government),
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presumed innocent,37 4 the Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, 375 and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment
due process rights.376 The Sixth Amendment grants the criminal
defendant the right to trial by an impartial jury,37 7 the right to
confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses, 378 the right to com-
pulsory process for obtaining favorable testimony379 and the right
to the assistance of counsel in preparing a defense.380 The
government, however, enjoys no comparable constitutional protec-
tions."' Moreover, unlike in the civil context, the discovery rules
in criminal trials favor the criminal defendant by placing an affinm-
ative duty on the prosecution to disclose evidence favorable to the
defense.382 The criminal defendants, however, have no reciprocal
duty and cannot be compelled to produce information against them-
374. See Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 453 (1895) (declaring that the right to be
presumed innocent lies at the foundation of the administration of our criminal law).
375. See U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (providing that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against themselves); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964) (holding that the
Fifth Amendment's guarantee against self-incrimination was made applicable to the states by the
Fourteenth Amendment); see also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426 (1956) (describing
this right as one of the most important advancements in the development of liberty and in society's
struggle to become civilized).
376. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (providing that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law); id. amend. XIV (declaring that no state may deny due process
to any person).
377. See id amend. VI (granting the criminal defendant the right to a speedy and public trial
by an impartial jury).
378. See i. amend. VI (providing that the accused shall be confronted with the witnesses
against him); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-404 (1965) (holding that the criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine witnesses is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).
379. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (granting the accused the right to compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor).
380. See i. amend. VI (providing that the accused shall have the assistance of counsel for his
defense); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 343 (1963) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment
makes the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of right to counsel obligatory upon the states).
381. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 17, McCollum (No. 91-
372); see U.S. CONST. amends. V, VI, XIV (making no mention of any rights granted to the
prosecution).
382. FED. R. CR51. P. 16; see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (holding that the
prosecution must disclose evidence favorable to the accused).
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selves.8 3 Finally, one of the strongest advantages afforded the
criminal defendant is the due process requirement that the govern-
ment prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt.384
The Framers of the Constitution granted these rights to criminal
defendants to protect them from government oppression during the
criminal trial.38 5 In fact, the entire criminal process is designed
to shift the constitutional balance in favor of criminal defendants
because of their personal stake in the outcome of the trial.386 It
is difficult to imagine a party to whom it would be less fair to call
a state actor than the criminal defendant who is engaged in a battle
against the state.387 Therefore, McCollum's conclusion that a
criminal defendant is a state actor is both illogical and unfair to the
criminal defendant. Furthermore, the Court's incorrect decision
ignores the criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to an
impartial jury.
383. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 18, McCollum (No. 91-
372); see Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 475 n.9 (1973) (stating that given the state's inherent
information-gathering advantages, the imbalance in. discovery rights should favor the defendant);
Respondent's Brief at 22, McCollum (No. 91-372) (stating that criminal defendants may secrete
evidence favorable to the prosecution); see also Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 427 (1956)
(declaring that it is better for an occasional crime to go unpunished than for the prosecution to use
enforced disclosures by the accused to build their criminal case).
384. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 18, McCollum (No. 91-
372); see In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that proof beyond
a reasonable doubt reflects the fundamental value in our legal system that it is worse to convict an
innocent person than to let a guilty person go free); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423-26 (1979)
(declaring that the high standard of proof in criminal case as compared with civil proceedings reflects
a societal belief that safeguards are necessary to protect the criminal defendant against deprivation
of life and liberty).
385. See Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422,428 (1956) (asserting that these rights were
aimed at preventing a recurrence of the Inquisition and the Star Chamber); Goldwasser, supra note
106, at 821-22 (stating that the Framers were particularly concerned with unchecked prosecutorial
power).
386. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (Black,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (asserting that the tactical advantage to the defendant is
inherent in the type of criminal trial required by our Bill of Rights).
387. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 19, McCollum (No. 91-
372) (arguing that the adversary relationship between the criminal defendant and the state precludes
a finding of stating action); see Goldwasser, supra note 106, at 820 (concluding that it is unfair to
consider a criminal defendant a state actor); supra note 195 and accompanying text (stating that the
second prong of the state action test requires that the private individual be fairly characterized as a
state actor).
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B. Unrestricted Peremptory Challenges Help to Secure the
Criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to an Impar-
tial Jury
The Sixth Amendment grants criminal defendants the right to
be tried by an impartial jury.38 Throughout the history of juries,
granting the defendant peremptory challenges has been considered
essential to achieving an impartial jury.389 In the final part of its
opinion, the McCollum majority briefly addressed the criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.39° The majority concluded
that the equal protection rights of the prospective jurors outweighed
the defendant's right to unrestricted peremptory challenges.391
However, the majority failed to consider the unique personal stake
that the criminal defendant has in the selection of the jury.392
Further, in choosing to elevate the jurors' rights over those of the
criminal defendant, the majority has misordered the priorities which
are basic to our criminal justice system.393
1. The Criminal Defendant has a Uniquely Personal Stake
in the Unrestricted Exercise of Peremptory Challenges
Peremptory challenges have long been considered an effective
tool in securing an impartial jury.3" Yet, as Blackstone
explained, "the law wills not that [a prisoner] should be tried by
388. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
389. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (noting the long held belief that the
peremptory challenge is a necessary part of the jury trial); Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370
(1892) (stating that the peremptory challenge comes from the common law with the trial by jury and
has always been considered essential to the fairness of trial by jury); see supra notes 75-98 and
accompanying text (reviewing the historical use of peremptory challenges).
390. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348,2357-59 (1992) (discussing whether the interests
served by Batson must give way to the rights of a criminal defendant).
391. See McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2358 (concluding that its decision will not undermine the
contribution of the peremptory challenge to the administration of justice).
392. See infra notes 394-400 and accompanying text (discussing the defendant's personal stake
in the criminal trial).
393. See McCollum, 112 S. CL at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring) (declaring that the majority's
holding produces a serious misordering of priorities because it leaves defendants with less means of
protecting themselves from biased juries).
394. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965).
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any one man against whom he has conceived a prejudice even
without being able to assign a reason for such dislike. 395 Thus,
another function of the peremptory challenge is to give effect to the
defendant's intuitive or subjective "dislike" of a potential juror.3
For the criminal defendant, everything about the criminal trial,
especially the selection of the jury, is intensely personal.39 In
contrast, the prosecutor represents the state whose constitutional
obligation to impartiality requires that its objective be to ensure
that justice is achieved. 391 The prosecution's involvement in the
trial is not personal but civic. 399 While it is completely appro-
priate to allow criminal defendants to challenge jurors based on
their personal intuition of bias, the obligation to justice prevents the
prosecution from acting upon personal feelings. ' °
2. The Criminal Defendant's Right to Unrestricted Per-
emptory Challenges Gives Expression to the Sixth
Amendment Right to Trial by an Impartial Jury
For over one hundred years, the Supreme Court has treated the
peremptory challenge as essential to securing the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to an impartial jury.4°1 During jury selection,
the defendant can observe the facial expressions and body language
395. 4 WILLIAM BiACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 353 (15th ed. 1809).
396. Brief for the National Association of Defense Lawyers at 26-28, McCollum (No. 91-372);
see Swain, 380 U.S. at 219 (stating that one function of the peremptory challenge is to assure
defendants that the jurors who decide their fate are fair and impartial).
397. See Goldwasser, supra note 106, at 829 (arguing that a major function of the peremptory
challenge is to give effect to the personal intuitive dislike of prospective jurors).
398. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); see National Association of Defense
Lawyers at 26, McCollum (No. 91-372) (stating that the prosecution, as a representative of the state,
must vindicate the public good without bias).
399. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 26, McCollum (No. 91-
372); see Goldwasser, supra note 106, at 830-31 (arguing that unlike the defendant, the prosecutor
cannot properly be viewed as personally involved in the trial).
400. See Goldwasser, supra note 106, at 829-31 (stating that as a representative of the state the
prosecutor has an obligation to act impartially, not based on personal feelings).
401. See Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370 (1892) (asserting that the defendant must be
allowed unfettered peremptory challenges so it can serve its function in securing a fair trial); see also
Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396 (1894) (referring to the peremptory challenge as one of the
most important rights guaranteed to the accused); supra notes 75-98 and accompanying text
(reviewing the historical foundation of the peremptory challenge).
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of the jurors.4°2 All of these physical expressions are signs of the
jurors' true feelings which will ultimately affect the outcome of the
trial.403 For example crossed legs, folded arms, and clenched fists
during questioning may signify hostility towards the defendant's
case.4 ' However, a defendant's intuition gained from these
observations about a juror's bias does not qualify the juror to be
excused for cause. Furthermore, when asked, most jurors will claim
that they can remain fair and assure the court that they can decide
the defendant's case impartially.4 5 Thus, the peremptory chal-
lenge is the defendant's only way to remove biased jurors who
deny their prejudice during voir dire.406 Thus, the McCollum
decision, by restricting the criminal defendant's peremptory chal-
lenge, forces the defendant to risk a biased jury.
3. The Criminal Defendant's Rights Outweigh the
Rights of Jurors
The majority in McCollum held that the rights of jurors out-
weigh the right of criminal defendants to use unrestricted peremp-
tory challenges. 7 However, this conclusion ignores the central
theme of our American criminal justice system.4°' The
Constitution and the Bill of Rights grant the criminal defendant
rights designed to protect the defendant from overzealous pro-
402. Brief for the National Association of Defense Lawyers at 32, McCollum (No. 91-372); see
GOBERT, supra note 1, at 461 (stating that non-verbal responses may betray verbal deceptions and
provide insight into a juror's true biases); id at 462-63 (discussing the interpretation of facial
expressions and body movements during voir dire).
403. Brief for the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers at 32-33, McCollum (No.
91-372); see STARR & MCCORMCK, supra note 26, at 224 (stating that jury composition can be the
single most important factor in determining the outcome of the defendant's case).
404. GOBERT, supra note 1, at 463.
405. See Babcock, supra note 27, at 550 (stating that jurors earnestly assert their ability to be
fair).
406. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219 (1965) (stating that one function of the
peremptory challenge is to remove partial jurors not removable through a challenge for cause);
Goidwasser, supra note 106, at 828 (arguing that in reality even when there is some indication of
bias, challenges for cause are often denied by trial judges).
407. Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348, 2357-59 (1992).
408. See supra note 386 and accompanying text (stating that the scales in a criminal trial are
tipped in favor of the defendant because the defendant has so much at stake).
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secutors. ° These protections recognize that the criminal defen-
dant is the one on trial and in jeopardy of losing liberty and
possibly even life.41 Thus, it is clear that the defendant has more
at stake than the juror who has been excluded by a peremptory
challenge.a
CONCLUSION
In Georgia v. McCollum, the Supreme Court continued the ero-
sion of the peremptory challenge by prohibiting criminal defendants
from using race-based peremptory challenges. The intended purpose
of the peremptory challenge, to help ensure that a criminal defen-
dant is tried by an impartial jury, is frustrated by requiring explan-
ations for its use. In order to prevent racial discrimination against
jurors, the Court has elevated the rights of jurors over the rights of
criminal defendants, even though it is the defendant that faces
imprisonment or even death.412 Although the McCollum Court
had the good intention of providing for greater racial harmony, the
decision is likely to backfire with adverse results for criminal
defendants. If our jury system is truly committed to providing the
criminal defendant with a fair and impartial trial, then it is better
for a juror to be excluded because of race than to risk the chance
that criminal defendants will be tried by jurors who are biased
against them.413
Jennifer Lee Urbanski
409. See supra notes 373-384 and accompanying text (discussing the rights granted to the
accused).
410. See supra notes 382-384 and accompanying text (explaining that the Constitution shifts
the balance to favor criminal defendants because of their personal stake in the outcome of the trial).
411. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. at 2360 (Thomas, J., concurring) (stating that the majority has
mistakenly exalted the rights of citizens to sit on juries over the rights of the criminal defendant to
a fair trial).
412. See id. at 2360 (characterizing the elevation of jurors' rights over the rights of criminal
defendants as a serious misordering of priorities).
413. See Respondent's Brief at 24, McCollum (No. 91-372) (citing Justice Harlan's assertion
that the constitutional safeguards protecting the accused are based on the ideal that it is better for a
guilty person to go free than for an innocent person to be convicted, in In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358
(1970)).
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